Afghanistan, Kashmir, China, and the Territorial Questions in South Asia

The nineteenth-century "great game" has taken on a new twist since 11 September 2001. The struggle over Afghanistan now has regional and global ramifications—the prospect of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear war, and further acts of terrorism by Muslim extremists, bringing the conflict into the heartland of the United States and the West.

"Dangerous" Kashmir

U.S. officials have called South Asia the most dangerous place on earth. This view was voiced by President Bill Clinton prior to his visit to South Asia in March 2000, almost two years after the Indian and Pakistani nuclear tests in May 1998. On 11 October 2001, Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told reporters again that Kashmir "is the most dangerous place in the world" and that the main purpose of Secretary of State Colin Powell's upcoming trip would be "to ensure that tensions between the two countries do not escalate." ¹ American newspapers have routinely assessed India and Pakistan as being on the brink of a nuclear war that only U.S. intervention could prevent.

These forebodings are somewhat overblown, although precautionary measures to avoid such an eventuality are necessary. Indian and Pakistani leaders are no less rational and responsible than American, Russian, and Chinese leaders. Some danger may lie on the Pakistani side, where radical Islamic extremists sympathetic to the al Qaeda movement, especially such sympathizers in the military establishment, could gain control of the nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In addition, several Pakistani leaders have threatened the use of nuclear weapons if India were to launch a conventional attack.

The worst-case scenario of the Kashmir conflict postulates an escalation of crossborder terrorism in Kashmir from sanctuaries in Pakistan, hot pursuit by Indian forces into Pakistani-controlled Kashmir, a Pakistani counterattack into Indian Kashmir, a full-scale Indian-Pakistani conventional war as in 1965 and 1971, a Pakistani nuclear preemptive strike against Indian cities, and finally catastrophic nuclear war in South Asia. ²

The very real danger is being caused by pro-Pakistani insurgents and terrorists operating in Kashmir, but it is important to understand that they are deliberately attempting to provoke an escalation while international, and especially American, attention is focused on "the most dangerous place on earth." Insurgency and terrorism intended to achieve succession and independence from an existing state thrive on overwhelming state retaliation and subsequent human rights violations and attendant international publicity and reaction. If, however, South Asia were called "the most boring place on earth" and the region ignored by American leaders and the media, then insurgency and terrorism would become futile, and the threat of nuclear war would disappear.

Prospects for an Afghan Postwar Government

The Bush administration plans to establish a structure of stability in the region after it has eliminated the Taliban regime and the al Qaeda with their special guest, Osama bin Laden. The plans include the setting up of a multiethnic Afghan regime led by Hamid Karzai under the symbolic leadership of the octogenarian King Zahir Shah and the resolution of the Kashmir issue so as to diffuse the prospect of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

Much of this may be wishful thinking. It seems unlikely at present that the Northern Alliance, composed of minority Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras, and the various tribal and religious factions of the majority Pashtuns in the south will cooperate under American occupation. There is rivalry and animosity among the Pashtun tribes and now surely between secular and religious Pashtuns. The Afghans were unable to create a unified stable government when the Soviet forces withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, and large-scale U.S. economic aid may only increase the struggle and corruption among them. Besides, the infusion of large-scale, "white" military forces from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization into Afghanistan is likely to arouse the basic Afghan instinct to fight and expel foreign forces.

For four months, from October 2001...