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  • The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action
  • Raymond Westphal Jr.
The Battle of Leyte Gulf: The Last Fleet Action. By H. P. Willmott. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005. ISBN 0-253-34528-6. Maps. Tables. Diagrams. Appendixes. Notes. Sources. Index. Pp. xi, 383. $35.00.

One must ask at the outset, if there is a need for another monograph on the Battle of Leyte Gulf. However, for those interested in the subject, H. P. Willmott's The Battle of Leyte Gulf offers a new perspective in an area which he has written about extensively over the last ten years. Willmott's most recent works include two separate analyses of Japanese and American tactics during the Second World War (2002) and an analysis of British naval planning against Japan (1996). In this new monograph, Willmott pursues two objectives, to provide a [End Page 267] detailed account of the battle and to examine the question of how nation states fight wars. Despite these lofty intentions, Willmott states that his monograph is not intended to highlight the individual commanders involved in the battle, in spite of their importance, as this is an area which has already been extensively scrutinized by both historians and naval planners.

To differentiate his monograph from past analyses of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, Willmott utilizes a number of different criteria which he applies throughout the book. To begin, he argues that the Battle of Leyte Gulf was in actuality a series of battles, not a single battle, a point which he suggests past analyses have failed to stress. Second, he argues that the battle(s) were unusual in a historical sense as this was one of the few contemporary full-scale fleet actions fought after the issue of victory and defeat had already been decided.

The book is divided into three sections. Chapters one through three examine the nature of naval warfare during World War II, highlight the Americans' naval situation in the aftermath of the victory at Leyte, and provide an in-depth analysis of the Imperial Japanese military forces after the defeat. Chapters four through seven examine in minute detail the series of battles which took place in Leyte Gulf from 24–25 October 1944, from the preliminary stages through the postscript. Chapter eight offers a brief conclusion, but primarily focuses on the blame, responsibility, and verdict of the battle.

While most of this monograph focuses on the details of the battle, in the final chapter Willmott changes direction. At the beginning of the chapter, Willmott offers a standard response to why he believes the Imperial Japanese Navy lost the battle and the subsequent war, arguing that they failed to understand the war that they initiated back in 1937 was open ended and failed to account for the industrial might of the United States. In addition to this line of reasoning, Willmott argues that the Battle of Leyte Gulf was the most comprehensive victory at sea in over 373 years as American forces destroyed over 1,559 aircraft and thus eliminated the only real defensive weapon the Japanese had left, stripped their escorts of protection, and provided the U.S. armed forces with an element of totality over their opponents. Following these hypotheses, Willmott ends his study by delving into an area he had said he wanted to avoid, examining the individual roles of Admirals William F. Halsey and Chester W. Nimitz. I found these analyses interesting and believe they could have been better used in the chapters which focused on the actual battle. Despite this observation, Willmott has produced an outstanding book which can be appreciated by naval historians and those who have a general interest in the subject.

Raymond Westphal Jr.
Stavanger, Norway
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