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Reviewed by:
  • Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919–1939
  • Branden Little
Battle Line: The United States Navy, 1919–1939. By Thomas C. Hone and Trent Hone. Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2006. ISBN 1-59114-378-0. Photographs. Figures. Tables. Appendixes. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 244. $34.95.

Battle Line reveals aspects of the U.S. Navy of the interwar period that many naval histories ignore. The authors, a father and son team, are experts in naval technology and administration. In this new book they provide a "portrait" of a navy groping with the challenges of transformation during the critical era between the world wars (p. 1). Battle Line examines much more than its title suggests, and covers in considerable detail the on-the-job training of officers and men aboard ship, the routines of life at sea, and the procurement and development of weapons systems. One of the book's greatest strengths is its how-to approach to explaining many aspects of navy life that are often left out of standard histories. For example, the intricacies of mooring a large warship and loading naval guns are superbly detailed. Moreover, the integration of oral histories, including Vice Admiral Lloyd M. Mustin's recollections, and excerpts from classics such as Richard McKenna's The Sand Pebbles (1962) greatly enriches the text. Battle Line persuasively argues that the navy's fighting effectiveness was (and remains) utterly dependent upon well-organized, highly trained, and motivated personnel.

Mahanian precepts of decisive battle permeated the navy in this era, but Battle Line barely addresses the navy's intellectual heritage. The deficiency this creates is that a reader may learn from this book how sailors handled ships but misunderstand the reasons why the navy intended to use its ships in a particular way. Injecting Mahan into this narrative would help to explain why the "Gun Club" was so very powerful and why capable officers who were not members of that fraternity were less likely to be promoted to high rank. Its obeisance to Mahanian dictums further indicates why the navy stubbornly resisted the joint development of amphibious doctrine, technology, and tactics. Many officers enticed by the lure of rival fleet engagements could not fathom a supporting role for the fleet. The authors are perhaps too forgiving of the navy's reverence for its increasingly obsolescent gun-centric fleet and for failing to adequately prepare for amphibious warfare.

Battle Line contends that in the interwar years the navy laid many foundations for the future Allied victory. Although it acknowledges the monumental contributions to victory made by naval cryptologists, logisticians, desk-bound bureaucrats, and marines, the book gives disproportionate attention to warship crews and the warships themselves. More equitable coverage would actually demonstrate the importance of these other indispensable participants. [End Page 250]

The book could also be improved if its chapters were more effectively integrated. They are not, however, due to the authors' admirable but somewhat inelegant attempt to mix the history of naval science, technology, and administration with traditional social history. The best syntheses of this type are David C. Evans's and Mark R. Peattie's study of the Japanese Navy, Kaigun (1997), and Ronald H. Spector's At War At Sea (2001). Battle Line is written for a lay audience, but its uneven coverage will likely prove a disappointment to readers seeking a fluid narrative. Nevertheless, Battle Line is worthwhile reading as an anthology containing discrete yet interrelated chapters. Its chapters on aviation and submarines are superb, and the entire volume will serve as a useful guide for continued investigation of the interwar navy.

Branden Little
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, California
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