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The Journal of Military History 71.1 (2006) 257-258

Reviewed by
Mary Glantz
Arlington, Virginia
Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933–1945. By Justus D. Doenecke and Mark A. Stoler. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005. ISBN 0-8476-9415-1. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. 248. $65.00.

As the title indicates, Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies, 1933–1945, is a debate between historians Justus Doenecke and Mark Stoler over President Franklin D. Roosevelt's conduct of foreign policy. In fairly brief essays, each historian assesses the quality of Roosevelt's leadership in light of the major international events of his presidency. These are truly global in dimension, including Roosevelt's relations with Latin America, his diplomacy with Europeans prior to the outbreak of World War II, his relationship with China and Japan, and his response to the Holocaust and Jewish refugees. In their introduction, the authors point out that these issues and Roosevelt's policies toward them have generated intense debate since their inception. They note, however, that as time has passed, the debate has evolved from an initially over-simplistic interpretation of the President and his policies, to the "more subtle and balanced portraits of this highly controversial individual" (p. 2) offered in the present volume. Nonetheless, despite the passage of time, Roosevelt's foreign policies remain controversial, and Doenecke and Stoler say they offer "strongly differing perspectives on the Roosevelt years" (p. 3). [End Page 257]

At first reading, the authors' perspectives do appear to be "strongly differing." Doenecke's essay, "The Roosevelt Foreign Policy: An Ambiguous Legacy," is highly critical of Roosevelt, with Doenecke arguing that there were "serious flaws in Roosevelt's foreign policy leadership" (p. 6). Roosevelt relied too much on the tactics of compromise and evasion—skills that served him well in American domestic politics, but that, in Doenecke's view, were not well suited for international relations. Doenecke supports this contention by citing example after example of areas where he believes Roosevelt made mistakes. The result is a survey of major events that is very comprehensive for only an 83-page essay, but reads like a laundry list of mistakes that Roosevelt made: from the London conference of 1933 (which he "effectively killed," infuriating the other nations) (p. 17) to Soviet involvement in the war against Japan where "expediency triumphed over principle" (p. 82). Doenecke's Roosevelt appears to be a dangerously incompetent President who did not do a single thing correct in his conduct of foreign policy. Thus, his conclusion that Roosevelt was "truly the architect of victory" (p. 88) is surprising and does not coincide with the preceding analyses.

In contrast, Mark Stoler's Roosevelt is flawed, yet better than any alternative. Stoler argues that Roosevelt must be judged in relation to his contemporaries, and he sets out to do this by placing Roosevelt's foreign policy actions in a broader historical context. Stoler covers much the same ground as Doenecke, but appears to spend more time analyzing the context of Roosevelt's decisions. Stoler also presents areas of historical controversy, pointing out the arguments surrounding an issue and choosing the theses that are most believable. He avoids being overly definitive in his conclusions, and is thus highly persuasive. When Stoler deals with those issues where historians have been most critical of Roosevelt, such as the Teheran and Yalta conferences, he raises the logical and important question: what was the alternative?

Debating Franklin D. Roosevelt's Foreign Policies illustrates how events and policies are open to differing interpretations. As a result, it is an outstanding book for those embarking on the study of history in general and U.S. diplomatic history in particular.

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