Post-Ismay Europe: Britain and the Rebalance of European Security

At the height of the Cold War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's first secretary-general, Lord Ismay, famously remarked that the real purpose of the transatlantic alliance was to keep the Americans in Europe, the Russians out, and the Germans down. Since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have withdrawn, the Germans have reunified, and the Americans remain engaged militarily in European affairs, albeit sporadically. Despite more than fifty years of peace and prosperity in Europe, the transatlantic relationship has not yet fully adapted itself to the post-Ismay world of European security affairs.

Although the many transatlantic political, economic, and military links that have carefully been nurtured since World War II are not likely to be wiped out overnight, recent events demonstrate how U.S.-European relations can quickly take divergent paths. Several hot issues on which the United States and Europe generally differ readily spring to mind, from major policies on missile defense, transatlantic trade and investment, the military capabilities gap, dealings with so-called rogue nations, and global climate change to cultural differences such as the death penalty, gun control, and genetically modified foods.

Two issues that threaten transatlantic stability are the development of a common European security and defense policy (ESDP) and the ongoing development of the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). After several decades of failure, the European Union has made enormous strides in recent years toward developing a defense capability to complement its economic clout in world affairs. Yet the recent development of the ESDP, as in so many previous attempts to create common European defense policy, has largely depended on the relationship between Europe's two strongest military powers, Great Britain and France. While Great Britain is one of America's closest and most trusted allies, as well as one of the strongest supporters of NATO, France has traditionally sought to enhance its own power and prestige in Europe through the deliberate diminishment of NATO and U.S. influence on the continent. As history has shown, the English Channel can often be more difficult for Great Britain to bridge politically than the Atlantic Ocean.

The overall American conception of transatlantic relations is neither clear nor consistent. The various strands of American transatlantic policy are self-conflicting and incompatible to an extent. Since Kennedy, the United States has encouraged Europe to become the "second pillar" of power in the Atlantic Alliance, to shoulder a greater share of the burden for Europe's defense and security, and to take the lead in European security matters in which the United States does not wish to lead, such as the civil wars in Yugoslavia. However, the United States does not wish to relinquish its peerless decision-making power in NATO to Europe. During the spring 1999 air campaign against Serbia, for example, the United States was often at odds with its European allies over the choice of targets--an argument that was always won by the United States. In a sense, U.S. policy is a mirror of Europe's own conflicted posture--a desire for greater authority without a simultaneous willingness to take on greater responsibilities.

The French challenge for the political, military, and economic independence of Europe has more or less been a constant feature in transatlantic relations since the late 1950s. Other European countries have generally vacillated between the French vision of a Europe Européene, entailing a Europe that is completely independent and free from American influence, and British atlanticism, which supports a United States that is deeply engaged in European affairs. Today, the transatlantic relationship is at a critical juncture. Europe's two most important organizations, NATO and the EU, which were once separate (and in a sense in competition between the British-American domination of NATO and French-German domination of the EU), are now slowly being intertwined. Can the competing British-American and French visions of Europe and, therefore, the...