Nunn-Lugar--A Tool for the New U.S.-Russian Strategic Relationship, Carnegie Nonproliferation Conference

The strategic environment during the Cold War was characterized by the high risk but low probability of a ballistic missile exchange between the superpowers. Today, however, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the opposite is the case--we live in a lower-risk but higher-probability environment with respect to ballistic missile exchanges. Whereas previous strategic calculations assumed more or less rational actors, experiences with Saddam Hussein, Osama bin Laden, and others make this assumption less plausible today.

The Current Threat Environment

Long-range missiles are seen as a cost-effective deterrent for countries that decry American "hegemony" or seek to deter international peacemaking efforts. If a future aggressor were to have ballistic missiles capable of reaching U.S. or allied territory, it might be tempted to blackmail the United States into standing by in the face of aggression. In fact, hostile powers possessing these dangerous weapons could fundamentally change the decision-making process with regard to the international engagement of the United States.

In short, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the number one national security threat facing the United States and its allies. More so than at any other time in the past, the spread of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery constitutes a profound and urgent threat at home and abroad. These weapons are seen by potential adversaries as possessing substantial utility, either for use against neighbors or as instruments of asymmetric warfare designed to overcome the conventional military superiority of the United States. They are becoming the "weapons of choice" rather than the "weapons of last resort." This more complex and dangerous environment requires us to rethink our strategies and the continuing utility of the traditional tools available to counter the threats our nation faces.

The Bush Administration's Approach

On 1 May 2001, at the National Defense University, President Bush shared his thoughts on the need to fundamentally change the parameters of strategic deterrence. I share the president's view that the United States needs to develop new concepts of deterrence that rely on both offensive and defensive forces to ensure the safety and security of the American people in the future. Deterrence can no longer be based solely on the threat of nuclear retaliation.

Agreements between the United States and Russia on missile defense and continued offensive arms reductions are important goals, but they are only part of the solution. Missile defense is not a silver bullet that, by itself, can adequately protect the United States and its allies from the enhanced threats posed by ballistic missile proliferation and the spread of weapons of mass destruction. But it is an important component that gives added credibility to the other elements of U.S. strategy as well as being a means to protect the American people if our nonproliferation and diplomatic efforts prove less than perfect. Equally important, agreements and unilateral declarations on reductions of offensive arms are successful only if they are fully implemented by both sides and can be verified. Only then will security and stability be enhanced.

Defense in Depth

I approach the response to these threats to American security through the prism of a "defense in depth." There are four main lines of defense against weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile threats. Individually, each is insufficient; together, they help to form the policy fabric of an integrated defense in depth.

• The first is prevention and entails activities at the source, such as the Nunn-Lugar/Cooperative Threat Reduction program, which has deactivated over fifty-five hundred nuclear warheads and endeavors to stop the spread of weapons of mass destruction and associated knowledge.
• The second is deterrence and interdiction and involves efforts to stem the flow of illicit trade in these weapons and materials at foreign and domestic borders.
• The third line of defense is crisis and consequence management and involves greater efforts...