The Jacobite Movement in Scotland and in Exile, 1746-1759 (review)

In this latest contribution to Jacobite historiography, Doron Zimmermann provides a compelling narrative of political intrigue, complete with armed resistance, kidnapping plots and covert operations. The fact that all of this activity took place after Culloden, of course, only makes it even more interesting. For Zimmermann dares to ask the question 'Whether the suppression of the '45, due to longstanding consensus, spelled the sudden end of Jacobite hopes, and British fears of another rising'.

In a well-documented thesis, Zimmermann ultimately concludes that the Jacobites not only survived military defeat but also, due to continued negotiations with various European powers personally carried out by Charles Stuart, remained a genuine—and a recognized—threat to the Hanoverian government until 1759, nearly fifteen years after Culloden. Any argument proposing the continued survival of a bona fide Jacobite menace after 1746 naturally flies in the face of established historiography. In response to the 'Jacosceptics'—those of the traditional Whig school of interpretation—Zimmermann cautions against the 'pitfalls of hindsight' that arise when we do not allow for the possibility of contingency. Rather he prefers to base his own argument on Frank McLynn's notion of 'historical contextualism'. By this reasoning the key point to understand is that the Hanoverian administration lacked the benefit afforded to Jacosceptic historians of knowing that the Jacobite threat would ultimately wane. Situated in the all too real world of eighteenth-century politics, the British government simply dared not risk the repercussions of discounting the real and present danger of further Jacobite activity.

Zimmermann relies extensively, but not exclusively, on the Stuart Papers housed at the Royal Archives. He also makes excellent use of the Pelham Papers located at Nottingham University and the State Papers of Scotland (classed SP54) found in The National Archives. Both of these (often neglected) collections are rich sources of insight into the political and military machinations of the British government when dealing with Scotland. Having utilized the Pelham and State Papers herself, the present reviewer can attest to the unique perspectives they offer upon the sometimes-fraught relationship between Scotland and England in the early eighteenth century.

Zimmerman also maintains that the Jacobites, while suffering a serious setback after Culloden, were able to regroup into smaller, localized units of resistance throughout the Highlands, continually thwarting Hanoverian attempts to bring them under control. Partly this was because, as became clear after Culloden, the Jacobite army had not been at full strength on the day of battle. In particular, Ewan MacPherson of Cluny's 2,000 men were not present, along with some 700 Glengarry MacDonells and MacGregors. Zimmermann estimates that these important regiments, coupled with several others that did not arrive at Culloden, add up to almost one-third of the Jacobite army still active and loyal to the Stuarts. It was these troops who, over the next year, dispersed throughout the Highlands, embarked on a campaign of resistance, usually in the form of cattle raids targeted at Whig landowners. There were also continued armed attacks on Hanoverian loyalists that the Government seemed incapable of bringing under control. With the borders poorly protected and native resentment at Cumberland's tactics growing, even among Hanoverians, the fear of another uprising was in fact widespread. As the Earl of Albemarle, in command of Government forces in Scotland, reported to the Duke of Newcastle late in 1746, 'Rebellion is not yet at an end'.

The Jacobite exiles, particularly in France, had also coalesced into a lobbying group of some influence, who managed to retain Louis XV's financial support even after Charles was later expelled. One of their more lasting contributions was the formation of Scottish regiments in the French service. The potential consequences of their continued presence was never lost on the British government. Furthermore, Charles's numerous attempts to convince Louis to support an invasion of England, which ultimately turned out to be futile, have met with scorn and ridicule by...