Intervening in Africa (review)

Herman J. Cohen: Intervening in Africa. New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000. 268 pages. ISBN 0-312-23221-7. $65.

Intervening in Africa presents the reader with a candid account of the U.S. decision-making process vis-à-vis Africa during the Reagan and Bush administrations. Author Herman Cohen served as a senior director for Africa at the National Security Council during the Reagan presidency in the mid to late 1980s and as assistant secretary of state from 1989 to 1993 under the first George Bush. From his unique perspective he offers valuable insights into the political machinations in the American bureaucracy and into the actions and concerns of his African counterparts. Cohen's book is an easy read with straightforward descriptions of policy debates and events within the State Department and the foreign policy establishment. In describing President Bush's refusal to allow the United States to take charge of the Liberian situation (including escorting President Samuel Doe into exile), Cohen writes that he was personally outraged, particularly by the absence of any real dialogue between those with the knowledge of the situation and those with the ultimate power of decision making.

Cohen describes his experiences in promoting conflict resolution and, to a lesser extent, democratization in seven African case studies: Ethiopia, Sudan, Mozambique, Angola, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia. In most of these instances, Cohen argues, U.S. government agencies worked together constructively and used Washington's high-profile engagement in conflict resolution to good effect. Cohen asserts that Cold War priorities drove U.S. policy interests in Africa. He also laments that the general unwillingness to commit resources to Africa was a major impediment to effective U.S. policy.

The influence of the United States derives from its accepted moral authority and neutrality when addressing conflicts abroad. In the cases cited, U.S. intervention was seen as providing a sense of security to participants in conflict-negotiation processes. According to Cohen, American influence can bring about effective negotiations especially when the United States is blunt and straightforward in dealing with parties to a conflict, when preconditions to talks are discouraged, when procedural haggling and discussion of constitutional reforms are not regarded as principal aspects of negotiations, and when cease-fires are not part of the negotiation process, since they tend to be endorsed by parties that are at a military disadvantage and often rejected by the other party. While Cohen and his Policy Coordinating Committee for Africa (which included representation from the Departments of State, Treasury, and Defense; the U.S. Agency for International Development; the U.S. Information Agency; the Central Intelligence Agency; and the National Security Council) endorsed these guidelines for effective negotiations, the case studies illustrate the difficulty in adhering to them.

In Rwanda for example, the United States did endorse a cease-fire together with negotiations, a policy that Cohen, in retrospect, has termed "rote diplomacy, which resulted in more harm than good." Successful negotiation requires the inclusion of all relevant actors, and Cohen argues that the United States should have pressured for the return of Rwandan refugees, who were forced out between 1959 and 1963 and assisted the United Nations High Commission for Refugees in the repatriation of these people. He also suggests that the United States should have been straight with President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda that the "invasion of Rwanda by uniformed members of the Ugandan Army was totally unacceptable."

In the case of Sudan, Cohen laments the exclusion of the National Islamic Front (NIF) leader, Hassan al-Turabi, from early efforts at national reconciliation. He acknowledges that Washington was not actively engaged in the peace process except for an occasional push at reconciliation. Washington's primary interest was the humanitarian situation and the civil war in southern Sudan because of congressional interest and advocacy. Cohen argues that his disengagement proposal was rejected by the government because it was viewed as a surrender by the NIF government. He blames both sides for frustrating a number of peace...