Implications of the NATO Attack against Yugoslavia for European Security and Russian-Western Relations

It would be naive to presume that the internationalization of the Yugoslav conflict is related primarily to attempts by European states and international organizations to find a just solution to the Kosovo issue. As has happened so often before, events in the Balkans are being used by leading European players as a mechanism for attaining their own political goals, which are entirely unrelated to the fate of Yugoslav peoples, be they Albanians, Serbs, or Montenegrins. These goals significantly transcend the parameters of regional interests. The evidence for this is twofold: Despite numerous other ethnopolitical conflicts in the world, the Yugoslav conflict became the number one topic on the current international political scene, and the strategic nature of the basic motive behind the major powers’ Yugoslavian policy is shown by the price they are willing to pay for it. Will this price turn out to be too high, in view of the fact that its probable ceiling delimits not only a new “cold” war but probably a third world war as well? ¹

In any case, it would not be an exaggeration to say that NATO bombing of Yugoslavia destroys the system of international relations created in the last decade. Having gone through a difficult period of ideological and military-political confrontation followed by easing of international tensions and a final ending of the Cold War between East and West, Europe, which was enjoying a new era of pan-European cooperation and partnership, once again is faced with destabilizing challenges. These challenges are not, as yet, irreversible, and, despite the gravity of the current political crisis, participants in the European security system are demonstrating a political will to resolve it in a spirit of cooperation and partnership. In order to preserve this strategic orientation, they need to prevent further serious erosion of the collective system, erosion that has resulted from uncoordinated policy efforts toward resolving the Yugoslav crisis. Otherwise, Europe might have to face a chain reaction of new political extremism and adventurism, which would be highly dangerous regardless of where it emerges.

Erosion of the European Collective Security System

After the end of the Cold War, Europe, having managed to overcome the very real danger of global military conflict, faced new threats and security challenges. One of the main such challenges was an increase in ethnopolitical conflicts and crises. However, the new political climate—which entailed closer links between East and West based on principles of mutual cooperation and partnership in creation of a peaceful Europe—opened up new possibilities for dealing with local European conflicts. Overcoming bipolar confrontation led to a substantial increase in the effectiveness of international organizations, including the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), in cases of anticrisis response. This was made possible by a wide political consensus of the participating countries. ² The North Atlantic Treaty Organization began to support the peacekeeping activity of the UN and OSCE and to provide its resources and experience for peacekeeping operations. ³ Interestingly, NATO efforts in developing a conceptual basis for new peacekeeping ventures were concentrated in newly created cooperation structures between former enemies, especially the North Atlantic Cooperation Council. During the peace process in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a principal peacekeeping model was established based on a division of labor between international and regional organizations: the operation was carried out under the sponsorship and leadership of the UN, while NATO, guided by its own procedures, acted on UN decisions that delegated certain powers to it. In implementing the UN Security Council resolutions, NATO relied on the assistance of other UN members. ⁴ Such assistance did not change the legal basis of the operation itself but added a pan-European dimension to it, thus increasing the legitimacy of the alliance’s actions. Especially valuable was Russia’s participation in the NATO-led Implentation Force/Stabilization Force peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This act of cooperation was viewed as a prototype for future joint responses to crisis.

With respect to Kosovo in 1999, NATO basically refused to follow the established basic model of peacemaking in Europe, having launched its own military operation in Yugoslavia. Such a scenario fundamentally changed the situation, and the NATO operation became a significant factor in the erosion of the European security system. This is exactly the interpretation that was given by Moscow. ⁵ Such a view is shared not only by the Russian people but I believe also by a large segment of the Western public.

Russia believes that NATO’s use of military power and offensive weapons against a sovereign country, and a member of the UN, is largely perceived as an act in violation of fundamental principles and rules of international law. Russia has taken the firmest stance in characterizing NATO’s action as armed aggression. ⁶ One illegitimate nature of NATO actions has been recognized (although not qualified as an act of aggression) in several European capitals. The prime minister of Sweden expressed regret that NATO resorted to military force without a UN mandate, while Sweden’s minister of foreign affairs said that she could not find anything in international law that would support NATO air attacks on targets in Serbia. ⁷ Greece, notwithstanding its NATO membership, has from the beginning called for an immediate cessation of military action. ⁸

Indeed, NATO military action violated a number of articles of the UN Charter’s Chapter 7, specifically Articles 39, 40, 41, and 42, which define the principal prerogatives of the Security Council with respect to threats to peace and acts of aggression. Some other resolutions adopted by the UN have been circumvented and violated, such as the UN General Assembly resolution of 9 December 1994, which supports Security Council control over activity aimed at supporting international peace and security, and the General Assembly resolution of 17 December 1984 requiring all states to refrain from any actions relating to armed intervention and occupation, violent change, the undermining of political order, and the destabilization and removal of governments. The UN General Assembly resolution of 14 December 1974 defines aggression as the “use of armed force by a state (or a group of states) against the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of another state or any other action incompatible with the UN Charter.” NATO actions also contradict not only the letter but the spirit of important international agreements, such as the Helsinki Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE’s predecessor) document of 1975 and the Russia-NATO Founding Document of 1997. ⁹ Also violated would seem to be NATO’s own founding document of 1949. ¹⁰ Similar limitations are imposed also by the constitutional provisions of many NATO states, which give Yugoslavia the legal grounds to file a complaint against the governments of those countries in the International Court of Justice.

Regardless of particular legal aspects, NATO military operations in Yugoslavia signify that the existing international legal system no longer provides guarantees for sovereign states against outside intervention that has not been sanctioned by the international community in accordance with the UN Charter and its procedures. The world now must be aware of the possibility of such aggression. ¹¹

NATO’s action against Yugoslavia thus presents Europe with two ways to establish security. Either NATO and non-NATO countries alike, while overcoming the Yugoslav crises, will undertake joint efforts to bridge gaps in European security structures and stabilize the situation through clearer regulations on anticrisis activity, especially military action, or future developments in European security will be based on a new role and policy of NATO, well aware of its political and military expansion. The latter would undoubtedly lead to a reevaluation of national doctrines concerning security and defense policy and of the principles and content of international relations in Europe and around the globe. If the first alternative represents a reestablishment of the system of cooperation and partnership, the second option would lead to its further erosion and in turn create the danger of security-policy renationalization (especially in situations where the role and effectiveness of the UN are diminished), new lines of division in Europe, and the enhancement of opposing views, all of which would represent fertile soil for new confrontations.

The new strategic concept of the alliance discussed at the April 1999 NATO summit in Washington further tips the scale of European security in favor of destabilization. First, the proclaimed commitment of NATO countries to peaceful resolution of conflicts, with the primary responsibility for international peace and security residing in the UN, is in obvious contradiction with NATO’s political actions. ¹² This contradiction became truly blatant in connection with NATO’s incessant bombing of Yugoslavia. Second, the principles enunciated in Washington officially raised the possibility that NATO would conduct other actions outside of its zone of responsibility, including military action beyond the Article 5 provisions of its treaty. NATO may undertake such action in crises that jeopardize Euro-Atlantic stability and could affect the security of alliance members. Evaluation of the threat is obviously NATO’s prerogative, as is the interpretation of stability. Other international organizations are also drawn into this deliberate vagueness. By including in their documents references to “threats to stability,” they would in effect bless NATO’s military “countermeasures.” From now on, NATO’s peacemaking actions undertaken pursuant to UN or OSCE decisions, as well as in operations under their aegis, are seen simply as one of the possible modalities for alliance military actions outside of its area of responsibility. ¹³ The adoption in Washington of a new set of strategic principles dissolved any hope that U.S. views with respect to alliance military action outside of the zone of responsibility would not be supported by its European allies. The adoption of such new strategies would, in any case, require review of NATO founding documents. ¹⁴

All of this makes it difficult, if not impossible, to reestablish the damaged balance of the international security system. The negative effects of NATO aggression against Yugoslavia will be felt in practically all areas related to European security. In essence, NATO military action contradicts the fundamental goals of European security, recognized and declared as being of highest priority by the alliance itself and its European partners, including Russia.

In sum, the climate of trust and cooperation in Europe has been undermined. The Euro-Atlantic region has essentially been split into two opposing camps—those who support the NATO position and those who are against it. This split is evidenced both between governments and in public opinion.

How should the world respond to the new situation? NATO’s image as a European peacemaker has been seriously damaged, and there is now a widespread perception of NATO as a global policeman. This view is further reinforced by the fact that the military action is largely perceived to be detached from attaining the political objectives declared by NATO. The alliance is now perceived as having undergone a true internal transformation since the end of the Cold War. From a defensive organization opposed to a powerful adversary in the East, NATO has been transformed into an expansionist alliance with respect to its territorial borders and to the possibilities of power projection, one that has offensive armed forces and operational plans. ¹⁵ In any case, NATO will not be able to neutralize its undermined image in the near future, and this will probably become a long-term factor diluting the alliance’s political potential. The political damage caused by this could be much greater than the political dividends NATO was counting on when it commenced its military operation in Yugoslavia.

Among the principal results anticipated from a military action in Yugoslavia was, apparently, the strengthening of NATO’s new role in the system of European security. Bombing Yugoslavia was not so much “the gravest mistake of Americans and American diplomacy,” as it was initially characterized by Russia’s Boris Yeltsin, ¹⁶ but rather a logical conclusion and mechanism for strengthening NATO’s new role. In essence, NATO’s evolution in the 1990s led the alliance step-by-step toward a broader interpretation of its peacemaking autonomy and role as “supporter” of UN efforts. ¹⁷ As a result, NATO not only progressed from actions undertaken pursuant to UN decisions and Security Council resolutions to actions which are in accordance with the “spirit” of those decisions and resolutions, but now it also envisions the possibility of independent interventions. The collapse of the UN, which lost any influence not only over the development of the Yugoslav conflict and its resolution but also over the actions of the alliance, led to NATO becoming the central structure of European security. However, NATO’s ability to maintain that role is not unchallenged, since not everybody in Europe, especially not in Russia, approves of this role. For NATO this lack of concert opens only two avenues: either to attempt to reestablish the damaged structure of balance in Europe and elsewhere or to evolve into a pan-European and world dictator.

Like the undermined capabilities and prestige of international organizations (the UN and OSCE), Russia’s role was also diminished. First, this is a direct consequence of the weakening of a security structure that had granted Russia a significant role in Europe. The leadership position was filled by NATO, whose decision making Russia cannot influence. Russia’s prestige has been diminished, as well, because, on the one hand, it did not succeed in effective regulation of the Kosovo crisis along with international organizations, and, on the other hand, it did not prevent or stop NATO attacks on Yugoslavia, which were not sanctioned by the UN and are not a result of broad European consensus. Russia’s claim to the role of a moral leader, which was justified from the point of view of its consistent condemnation of aggression and its refraining from confrontational reaction, has some serious limitations. The main ones are Russia’s policy of force in the post-Soviet era (especially the war in Chechnya) and its close links to the undemocratic regime of Serbia’s Slobodan Milosevic. Russia’s role in seeking solutions to the Yugoslav crisis and restoration of destroyed European security largely depends on the degree to which it will be able to oppose NATO policy and support Yugoslav sovereignty while at the same time distancing itself from the Milosevic regime. Russia, apparently, is slowly moving in this direction, which is difficult in view of Moscow’s involuntary mediation between Belgrade and the West.

Military action in Yugoslavia dealt a double blow to the political potential of the main participants in the peace process, diminishing their political abilities, on the one hand, and limiting the scope of potential cooperation, on the other. In this context, it would be useful to analyze the effect of the crisis on the process of European integration.

The image, prestige, and potential of the European Union have also been significantly damaged during the Kosovo crisis. Shortly before the NATO operation began, the EU adopted far-reaching initiatives concerning the creation of a European security identity based on the development of common foreign, security, and defense policies. These ambitious plans have been discredited in light of the events in Yugoslavia. Europeans demonstrated their obvious inability to exert a stabilizing influence over the United States in Europe, even though U.S. interests differ from the interests of the Europeans themselves. Settling European problems through military means and force is an important mechanism for strengthening the U.S. political role in Europe, which, in turn, is forced to rely unconditionally on U.S. leadership. This turns into a serious obstacle for the development of autonomous ties between Western Europe and Russia, which had been developing in recent years. The EU Common Strategy on Russia has been seriously undermined by the changes in relations between Russia and the West, especially with respect to security cooperation. Thus, the relative weakening of the direct linkages between Western Europe and Russia significantly weakens the EU as a power center in a multipolar world. On the other hand, the intervention against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia amplified the tendencies to strengthen the U.S. leadership, which perceives the essence of European identity to consist mainly of Europe’s obedient following of U.S. global policies. Strengthening the role of the United States as a Western leader in resolving complex European crises and conflicts gives Americans a trusted and tried leverage against Europeans—namely, an ability to blackmail them with threats of a U.S. departure from Europe, which would lead to a high likelihood of losing control over conflicts and their escalation. The effect of strengthening the U.S. role in Europe as a result of military action in Yugoslavia is evidenced not only in the area of security but also in the general balance between the United States and Western Europe. For example, some experts saw a connection between the sudden surge of the Dow-Jones index and a parallel drop of the euro.

In sum, the recent trend of a relative decline in the U.S. role in Europe with simultaneous strengthening of the EU position has been substantially curbed. Especially dangerous is the fact that this U.S.-orchestrated consequence will convince the United States even further of the efficiency of a kind of steamroller political attitude.

Negative effects of the NATO actions in Yugoslavia were also felt in such important areas of security as arms control and nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology. The actions of NATO have given an incentive to other states to undertake appropriate measures in response to new European realities. Bearing in mind that the most reliable protection against possible aggression is an ability to deal a major blow to the enemy, the danger of a new arms race has increased. This concerns not only nuclear but also other types of weapons, such as bacteriological. Moreover, the lack of legal justification for NATO’s actions represents a powerful counterblow and a grave moral and political setback for the policy of nonproliferation. The motivation for other types of disarmament and limitation of armaments has also been affected. NATO has demonstrated that traditional wars and conflicts, often the focus of the entire disarmament process to date, are replaced by a new kind of military action, where the key role is given to high-precision arms, intelligence, command and control, and high mobility. In view of this, the following question arises: What is the purpose of the Convention on Force in Europe and the hard work related to its adaptation and ratification, if it posed absolutely no obstacles to a major NATO air campaign in the European theater? This question could also be paraphrased in broader terms: Could the creation of peaceful and secure Europe remain a political basis for negotiation in a situation where its parties have radically opposing views with respect to possible use of armed forces?

NATO operations in Yugoslavia also have had a contradictory effect on the possibility of using military means to settle European crises and conflicts. On the one hand, the fact that force was used against those who violated UN resolutions would undoubtedly become a deterrent to those who consider violating international norms and agreements. On the other hand, the use of military force against Yugoslavia thwarted the attainment of political objectives, which were officially proclaimed as the main motives for this operation. NATO actions not only failed to prevent humanitarian catastrophe but, in effect, are responsible for causing it. The Albanian population was forced out of Kosovo, while the return of refugees became a much more difficult task. NATO air raids resulted in the deaths of innocent civilians, while the Yugoslav civilian economy was gravely damaged. As a result of this, NATO was faced with a difficult choice: either to end the air campaign and attempt to resolve the Kosovo conflict through political or diplomatic means, or to continue on the military path and send in the ground troops. In a situation in which Yugoslavia demonstrated it was ready to defend itself against an outside invasion until a final victory; in which a number of states, including Russia, and a large segment of world opinion opposed NATO military action; and in which a consensus among NATO members with respect to ground troops became truly problematic, a decision in favor of such an operation became extremely difficult, and would have been even less politically effective than the air campaign. All of this implies that NATO’s readiness to use similar kinds of military power in the future is reduced. That would correspondingly reduce the credibility of future NATO threats to use its power as an instrument of political pressure. This, in turn, weakens the ability of the international community to settle conflicts and crises in Europe, since the success and wisdom of threats to use force, declared by NATO Secretary Manfred Werner in February 1994 after the Serbs gave in to the Sarajevo ultimatum, ¹⁸ will probably be undermined by the political impracticality of its implementation in light of the current events in Yugoslavia.

The task of resolving the Kosovo issue, formally declared to be the objective of the NATO operation, is in contradiction with the practical consequences of this operation from the standpoint of regional stability. Internationalization of the Kosovo crisis revealed a number of new threats to security in the Balkans. Kosovar refugees represent a serious security challenge to neighboring countries, particularly Albania and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). Moreover, there is a growing potential for new ethnopolitical conflict. In FYROM, where Albanians already constituted a large segment of the population, the increase in their numbers caused by the influx of Kosovar refugees may provoke another conflict, perhaps an even more serious one. The Skopje government already has expressed fears that the Kosovo Liberation Army may shift its attention to FYROM itself. With respect to Kosovar refugees, Albania is also facing tremendous difficulties, which exacerbate the already difficult task of the international community to stabilize that country. Regionalizing the Kosovo crisis creates fertile soil for nurturing the concept of Greater Albania. Autonomy (if not secession) of Kosovo, so decisively endorsed by NATO, may become a fatal example for separatist movements of other minorities in the Balkans—for example, Greeks in Northern Epirus. It is obvious that growing separatism in the Balkans is spilling over regional borders, and its accumulating critical mass poses a risk for Balkanization of the whole Euro-Atlantic region.

In broader terms, the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia elevated a local ethnic conflict (of a below average tragic scope, as judged by the standards of the 1990s) into an international political and possibly military confrontation with a possibility for expansion beyond the Balkans and even Europe. ¹⁹ Is this the very possibility envisioned by the new NATO strategic concept in stating that the “possibility of such a threat [large-scale conventional aggression against the alliance] emerging over the longer term exists”? This is reflected in a deep crisis that has developed between Russia and the West, the content of which is not comparable to the nature of their previous differences regarding international relations and security policy. ²⁰

The Erosion in Relations between the West and Russia

The common point of all principal Western security documents is that a reliable system of European security may not exist without the active and constructive participation and cooperation of Russia. Based on that, the development of a partnership with Russia is recognized as a major political objective in the West. However, it is obvious that NATO’s policy in Yugoslavia is not only incompatible with that objective but, in fact, openly violates it. In the best case, it represents a major political failure for the West caused by underestimating the destructive effect of the Yugoslav crisis on relations with Russia. In the worst case, it represents a deliberate orientation of the West, and most of all the United States, toward tipping the geopolitical balance in its favor in light of Russia’s current weak position. ²¹

Opting for one of these explanations for Western policy (strategic mistake or an intelligent strategy) could define the future Russian stance in relations with the West. The first scenario could be described as an “ace” option of a “pink liberalism.” It would signify an exaggeration of the Western positive intentions without taking into account its policy’s serious adverse consequences for Russia and European security. In that case, Russia’s realistic national interest would be sacrificed to a lesser or greater degree in the name of preserving a partnership with the West in its Western interpretation. The other scenario—equal to an admission that Western policy in Yugoslavia is based on an anti-Russian strategy—could lead to a Russian orientation toward isolationism and confrontation with the West.

The initially popular thesis of a strategic error by the West was silenced in Russia by statements of various political factions claiming that Western strategy is anti-Russian in its nature. For public opinion in Russia, NATO’s military aggression became the last piece of a puzzle demonstrating Russia’s role as a loser in the Cold War. From that point of view, all Western policies over the past few years were viewed in light of the events in Yugoslavia. NATO’s political transformation was seen as a mechanism for achieving its dominant status in the system of European security. This domination is backed by a powerful military machine, able to engage in a complete range of modern military operations. The combining of political and military leadership in Europe allows NATO, as evidenced by events in Yugoslavia, to resort to direct use of military and political force, if needed, even outside its zone of responsibility. In that light, the expansion of the zone of stability achieved through new NATO members is, in fact, a military and political expansion of this organization, which now includes a majority of European states. Limited partnership with Russia is not viewed by NATO as a goal in itself, aimed at strengthening European security, but rather as a means of neutralizing possible Russian opposition to the expansionist policies of the West. Such policies are aimed at diminishing Russian influence in the zone of its vital interests by breaking off Central and Eastern European as well as post-Soviet states. This type of policy may, in the end, lead to the disintegration of Russia itself.

Moscow initially was torn between two interpretations. On one hand, there was talk of a serious miscalculation on the part of the West. On the other, Moscow’s extremely stern statements reminded one of Cold War rhetoric. In addition, regardless of its fairly harsh qualification of NATO’s actions, Russia did not define a clear political direction in the context of the Yugoslav crisis. One explanation was probably an expectation that NATO would either recognize the legal invalidity of its actions or, at least, refrain from continued bombing and agree to act within the established international regime of settling crises. Unfortunately, that did not happen, and Russia is now required to define a clear political position, even with respect to its overall relations with the West.

The Russian government faced a dilemma. A position of patience and understanding was out of the question, while a confrontational response was deemed detrimental both for the Russian government and for Russia itself. A weakened Russia would not survive new confrontation and isolation, which would ultimately result in a return to totalitarianism and poverty. The single viable option was a third way, based on a dialectic approach to Western policy. Its assessment was as follows: The West aspired to solidify important political results of the changes in Europe by using Yugoslavia as a training site, disregarding the interests of other nations, including Russia, and all the negative consequences that aggressive operations might have on European security. By adopting this view, Russia was able to offer critical assessments of NATO military action while keeping open the option of interacting with the West in order to mitigate the damage caused by military action and to participate in the settlement in the Balkans. Such a pragmatic policy had to provide a cover for those political prescriptions that threatened to push Russia into confrontation with the West.

The main goal of Russia was to avoid being drawn into the war, which would have put the world on the verge of a global military conflict. Moscow did not take advantage of the situation to violate the embargo against Yugoslavia and refused to provide any kind of military assistance—arms, military experts, or volunteers. This same approach was taken in assessing the proposal to accept Yugoslavia into the Russia-Belarus alliance, which would constitute a joint resistance to aggression. (Had Russia declined to provide to Belgrade military assistance under an alliance arrangement, it would have resulted in a complete degradation of its regional influence.) Russian officials chose not to seek alliances with countries in other regions in order to create a counterbalance to NATO and the West.

Strong sentiments of solidarity with Serbs and Montenegrins are an important factor among Russians, which may not be ignored by Russian officials in developing their policy. Regardless of that, by providing humanitarian assistance to all parts of Yugoslavia and all affected individuals regardless of their ethnic background, Russia demonstrated a tendency to avoid ethnic and particularly religious biases in its policy.

The other main element of the Russian policy was that it was able to refrain from spreading anti-NATO rhetoric into its entire relations with the West. Having frozen its links with NATO, Russia continued, rather successfully, its negotiations with the international financial institutions, made no changes in its relations with the EU, and intensified the dialogue with the Western countries, both on bilateral and multilateral levels, within the frameworks of the contact group and the G-8. The latter, based on a Russian initiative, became involved in the Yugoslav crisis at the level of political directors.

Russia now continues to maintain this position regarding the NATO operation, in both legal and political respects. In addition, the orientation to continue interacting with the West on the issue of the Yugoslav crisis and to avoid further complications and a deterioration of the relations between Russia and the West and forces Moscow to refrain from expanding this position into the realm of practical policy, i.e., treating Western countries, or members of NATO, as aggressors. ²² It is considered sufficient to list the measures aimed at curbing relations with NATO: expelling NATO representatives from Moscow, recalling Russia’s chief military representative to NATO, removing Russian troops from under the NATO operational command in Bosnia, suspending Russia’s participation in the Partnership for Peace program, and delaying the implementation of cooperative programs between Russia and NATO. ²³

The West, in turn, has demonstrated its readiness to clarify paths of interaction with Russia, stressing their common political goals with respect to a political settlement of the Yugoslav crisis and to the achievement of European security. Moreover, NATO’s switch from military action to the possibility of a political settlement would have been impossible without the involvement of Russia, which in turn, took upon itself to be an intermediary between Yugoslavia and the West. Even if this interaction is perceived to be a forced cooperation, it is still a crucial factor in preserving and developing constructive relations between Russia and the West.

All of this suggests that the crisis in relations between Russia and the West may be overcome. However, another point is also evident: the content of these relations will be modified as a result of the Yugoslav experience. The nature and dimensions of such modifications depend on a large set of variables, the most important of which are

the readiness of the West to reestablish the damaged system of international relations and peaceful settlement through clear rules that take into account the crisis surrounding Yugoslavia;

the ability of Russia to handle its internal situation, especially the neutralization of left-nationalist and militant forces and views;

the ability of the West to refrain from further steps that would be viewed by Russia as new serious threats to its national interests (such as accepting Baltic states into NATO membership);

the ability of Russia itself to limit appropriate defense and security measures undertaken in light of the Yugoslav experience; and

the willingness of the West to provide sufficient moral and political compensation for damages caused to Russia’s interests and prestige by the NATO operation.

Various configurations of these variables are possible, and an analysis of these is beyond the scope of this essay. Russia’s continuous objection to NATO aggression may be considered to be a constant factor, which illustrates that the future of relations between Russia and the West is in the hands of the West. If NATO decides against compromising and reestablishing the damaged framework of norms and principles of international relations, an unyielding Russian stance will push Moscow to respond appropriately, which would consequently lead to a deterioration of the relations with the West, something that Russia is trying to avoid. Taking into account possible Western concessions (open capitulation and admission of its policy’s faultiness are out of the question) and cooperation and understanding on the part of Russia, the most probable scenario for the evolution of relations between Russia and the West, after the NATO operation in Yugoslavia has ended, seems to be the preservation of a pattern of nonconfrontational relations with a certain amount of cooling. However, the level of cooling would differ in various realms of Russian policy. Events in Yugoslavia would affect Russia’s relations with NATO and the United States the most, while its relations with European countries and organizations would be affected to a lesser degree. Additionally, the development of links between Russia and the West may for both become a path that enables them to compensate for the narrowing of other forms of dialogue and interaction. ²⁴

All in all, regardless of its paradoxical nature, the Yugoslav crisis may eventually become fertile soil for positive reevaluation of the relations between Russia and the West. Two important facts need to be recognized. First, relations between Russia and the West are far from the level of strategic partnership. This could not survive the challenges of the Yugoslav crisis. Second, the current level is inadequate for the tasks of strengthening European security, even in the area of responding to crises. The conclusion is clear: a crucial condition for a true strengthening of European security that would enable Europe to erase serious political crises from its map, must be the development of traditional ties and the creation of new joint mechanisms for adopting and implementing decisions based on the equal participation of Russia and the West. At that point, from relatively chilly positions, relations can move, perhaps not necessarily toward partnership, but at least toward true neighborly relations, with broad interaction and guarantees that the actions of one neighbor would not conflict with the vital interests of the other. Even the relations between Russia and the larger West could develop in the context of such principles. With sufficient political will on the part of all parties, Russia could slowly become included in the process of formulating decisions in the North Atlantic Alliance, as an associate member with the right to vote on certain issues. Additional possibilities exist in the development of partnership between Russia and the EU, which, in turn, could take the form of the institutionalization of the European nucleus in NATO. The type of relationship between Russia and NATO that existed prior to the eruption of the Yugoslav conflict and that did not allow Russia to demand NATO’s respect or consideration of its most vital interests is not only no longer acceptable to Russia but probably could not be reestablished in view of the current internal anti-NATO opposition. ²⁵

In any case, it is important to recognize that NATO aggression in Yugoslavia, regardless of its justification, has transformed NATO into an enemy in the eyes of many Russians. ²⁶ The slogan “Today Yugoslavia—tomorrow Russia” has met with the greatest support and understanding among the Russian public. This sentiment has already become a significant factor in both internal and external policies of Russia. The image of an enemy in a weakened and humiliated country is too strong a card in the hands of power-aspiring national-communists. If previously the West reacted skeptically to the possibility of an antidemocratic Russian regime and ideology, it is now for the first time faced with such a realistic possibility. The upcoming Russian elections are becoming a serious challenge not only for Moscow but also for its strategic partners. At this stage there is no common strategy. If the West is not afraid of a new confrontation with Russia, perhaps it should ask itself if it is prepared to accept a new wave of Russian immigrants?