The Pentagon and the Presidency: Civil-Military Relations from FDR to George W. Bush (review)

As Herspring notes in the introduction, this important work is one of the few serious studies of civil-military relations from the latter's "vantage point of the 'controlled'" (xii). The chief findings that this approach yields is that the military increasingly operates as a bureaucratic interest group and that presidents need to understand and work with the particular cultures of the service branches or, increasingly, with a more general military culture.

The introductory chapter provides a good overview of the argument as well as a useful literature review. The main body of the work is appropriately structured with individual chapters on each president from Franklin Delano Roosevelt to George W. Bush. Each chapter begins with an analysis of presidential leadership style and then proceeds to a number of case studies on civilian-military relations in each administration. The writing is lively and informative, and the analysis is thorough, although Herspring relies chiefly on secondary sources. Although archival research might have provided a more nuanced analysis in some cases, the work is enriched by Herspring's own extensive experience as a naval officer, member of the foreign service (including two stints in the Pentagon), as well as a professional political scientist.

Throughout the book, and particularly in the concluding chapter, Herspring's approach allows him to focus on the degree of conflict generated by the president's handling of the military, and it yields important empirical observations. But Herspring's military vantage point, though valuable, is not without limits when moving from the empirical to the normative consideration of effective policy decisions, which this study invites. Paying attention to military culture "will minimize conflict and improve [a president's] relationship with the Chiefs" (426). But should presidents, from their leadership perspective, embrace such deference? Is low conflict and deference a guarantor not just of good relations but of good policy? Herspring does not fully answer these questions although hints are provided in his case studies.

Herspring is most convincing about the difficulties encountered by "high conflict" presidents (Richard Nixon, Lyndon Baines Johnson, and Bill Clinton). But differentiating the effectiveness of "moderate conflict" presidents (Harry Truman, Dwight D. Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, and George W. Bush) from that of "minimal conflict" presidents (Roosevelt, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H. W. Bush) is harder to do. Kennedy erred in not understanding that military acquiescence to the cia's Bay of Pigs plans signaled reservations rather than support. But was Truman really ill-advised by pressing for unification, desegregating the army, or canceling the Navy's super carrier while funding the Air Force's B-36 bomber? Likewise, was the conflict generated by Eisenhower's budgetary concerns and New Look strategy not worth the cost? Despite the Joint Chiefs' opposition, Eisenhower held the line on military spending, achieved budget surpluses, and got "more bang for the buck" without having to use nuclear weapons or significantly expand conventional forces.

Presidents who pay due respect to military culture may avoid conflict and make the military happy, but that strategy is no guarantee—or, in some cases, not even a condition of—effective presidential national-security leadership, much less wise policy decisions and outcomes.