American Military Technology: The Life Story of a Technology (review)

This volume looks at the American military's engagement with warfare and technology from the Revolutionary War to the 1991 Gulf War. Enlivened by photographs and potted biographies of influential technocrats and military leaders, it is an attractive primer that should prove useful to readers looking for a straightforward and jargon-free introduction to the complex relationship existing between the American military and its tools (and toolmakers) of war. Along with military technologies and their social contexts, the authors also address medical contributions, including Walter Reed's efforts to suppress typhoid and yellow fever, and scientific contributions, notably J. Robert Oppenheimer's work on the atomic bomb. For the most part the authors avoid controversy. In a statement of breathtaking simplicity, they note that a uranium bomb "destroyed Hiroshima, a plutonium bomb Nagasaki, and Japan surrendered" (p. 104). No mention is made of opposition to or criticism of the use of atomic bombs, whether by scientists before August 1945 or by postwar critics citing Cold War imperatives. Perhaps the authors believe enough ink has been spilled on this controversy, but some reference to the intense debate surrounding the Fiftieth Anniversary exhibit at the Smithsonian would have highlighted the ironies, tragedies, and emotions generated by modern weaponry and war.

Sidebars that highlighted salient issues in the historiography of technology and the U.S. military would have enhanced the value of this book. Notably absent is any critical discussion of biological and chemical weaponry. Meanwhile, the select bibliography fails to list works by Lewis Mumford (perhaps the most incisive critic of the U.S. military's "megamachine") or relevant articles from the Journal of Military History, Technology and Culture, and similar scholarly journals. While a book that takes time to define terms like "bullet" and "bayonet" is obviously intended for the uninitiated, one might also expect guidance with respect to more advanced themes. Controversial themes and issues such as interservice rivalries, political and economic pressures, and President Eisenhower's warning about the military-industrial complex are not developed fully.

Curiously, although published in 2006, the timeline of this book ends in 1999 with air attacks in Kosovo. Similarly, the last chapter ends with a rushed account of the Gulf War of 1991 and the concept of a "Revolution in Military Affairs." One might imagine a different (and timelier), post 9-11 conclusion, perhaps stressing the difficulties of asymmetrical warfare and the unpredictable and often surprisingly labile nature of technology (e.g., "civilian" cell phones used as triggers for roadside bombs). The American military's enormous investment in high-tech weaponry in the 1980s and 1990s was geared primarily to conventional conflicts against like-minded opponents; the wisdom of this investment is now being tested in low-intensity conflicts and messy urban settings like Iraq. Here the authors could have built on their discussion of the Vietnam War, where they note that American technical virtuosity did not produce victory, forcing the military to reconsider its emphasis on superior technology as uniquely efficacious. Nevertheless, the strength of this volume is that it provides solid historical underpinnings for more advanced discussions about, and research into, these and similar subjects.