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Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and Culture 5.1 (2002) 173-179



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Response

Michael Gorman


"But Then They Are Told . . ."

The argument I want to discuss appears at the very end of the passage, beginning with "I would rather rest my defense. . . ." Rachels asks us to consider two situations. In what I shall call "Decision Situation 1," a couple is deciding whether to have two children in the belief that if they have only one, it will die as a teenager (see below for details). In what I shall call "Decision Situation 2," a couple with two children is deciding whether to have bone marrow transplanted from their younger to their older child. Let us say that "Decision 1" is the decision in favor of having two children, and "Decision 2" is the decision in favor of having the bone marrow transplanted. And finally let us call what Mr. and Mrs. Ayala decided to do, namely, have a second child in order to have some of its bone marrow transplanted to their first child, "the Ayalas' decision."

Rachels' argument, then, is this:

(1) Decision 1 is permissible.

(2) Decision 2 is permissible.

(3) If Decision 1 and Decision 2 are permissible, then the Ayalas' decision is permissible.

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(4) The Ayalas' decision is permissible.

As it stands, the argument is valid.

There are many things one could say about this. Two issues I will not discuss are the following. First, one might ask whether ethics is really about what is permissible. That seems like aiming at an ethical C- instead of at an ethical A+. Second, one might ask whether (2) [End Page 173] is true, i.e., whether it is in fact permissible to take bone marrow from a minor child to benefit someone else.

I want to focus on (1), and I want to make two points overall. First, (1) is neither true nor false but instead empty. Therefore (4), the conclusion, has no support. Second, improved versions of (1) result in the argument's being either unsound or circular.

To see why (1) is empty, let us look more closely at what Rachels says about Decision Situation 1. A couple is considering whether to have one child or two. They are leaning toward having just one. "But then they are told that if they have only one child it will die when it is a teenager. However, if they have two, both will probably live full lives." Rachels asks, "Would it be wrong for the couple to decide, for this reason, to have two children?"

The first response I want to give to Rachels' question is a flippant one. Would it be wrong for a couple to decide to have two children for the reason that they have been told that, if they do, both will probably live full lives but if they have only one it will die as a teenager? I'm not sure whether it would be wrong, but it would be stupid. Why should they put any credence in this? Who has told them? Have they been visiting Greek oracles on their honeymoon? And on the face of it, this thing they have been told is extremely implausible. Do children without siblings have high teenage mortality? And what would happen if the imaginary couple had three children? Would the middle one murder the other two but then repent and go on to become a great humanitarian--or perhaps just a perplexed trolley driver?

Now of course this is a flippant answer. "They've been told that p" is just a way of saying, "It is the case that p and they know it," or something like that. But the point of my flippant remark is that what Rachels says they know cannot be all they know. There must be some further facts that are partly constitutive of Decision Situation 1, further facts in virtue of which having one child will result in its untimely demise while having two children will probably result in [End Page 174] two full lives. And these further facts will be...

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