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  • Of Little Faith: The Politics of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiatives
  • William Belk
Of Little Faith: The Politics of George W. Bush’s Faith-Based Initiatives. By Amy E. Black, Douglas L. Koopman, and David K. Ryden. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2004; pp xi + 308. $49.95 cloth; $26.95 paper.

In his January 2001 inaugural address, President George W. Bush promised that "[c]hurch and charity, synagogue and mosque . . . will have an honored place in our plans and in our laws." Of Little Faith: The Politics of George W. Bush's Faith-Based Initiatives chronicles the two-year attempt to transform this central campaign vision into constitutionally sound legislation. The authors found [End Page 312] themselves peripherally involved in this legislative battle and came to realize "we were witnessing a public policy story in progress that needed to be told" (vii).

The introduction provides a broad theoretical and temporal overview, arguing the value in viewing these unfolding events as public policy, as party/interest politics, and as religion in the public square. In a wide-ranging discussion, Bush's faith-based initiatives are cast within an array of topics including the nexus of race, religion, and politics; interest group politics; the legislative process; and religion in the public square.

Chapter 1 begins with a history of charitable choice, federal social services, and the constitutional backdrop of church-state issues, focusing on the period of "no-aid" separation beginning with 1947 and closing with the 2000 U.S. Supreme Court decision in Mitchell v. Holmes that suggested a new judicial atmosphere of acceptance of closer relations. In 1995, Senator John Ashcroft introduced charitable choice provisions as part of the House comprehensive welfare reform bill and was able to shepherd that language through a rancorous floor debate and into the law signed by President Clinton. Three additional pieces of legislation with charitable choice provisions became law during the second Clinton administration, although none actually was implemented prior to Clinton's leaving office.

In chapter 2, the authors demonstrate that "[c]ampaign 2000 was the campaign of faith-based politics" (77). Gore promoted his own faith-based initiatives partially from personal conviction, partially to challenge the Republican claim to "the religious vote," and partially to distance himself from the perceived immorality of Bill Clinton. For Bush, however, the issue was one of "great personal importance" (88), allowing him to appeal to his social conservative base while offering traditional libertarians the promise of smaller federal government, the epitome of his "compassionate conservative" campaign.

In chapters 3 and 4, the authors draw upon interviews, news media, and their own direct access to chronicle the two-year legislative life cycle, noting that "[l]egislative efforts got off to a muddled start, as faith-based legislation took a back seat to Bush priorities of income tax reduction and educational reform" (110). John DiIulio Jr., chosen to lead the White House Office of Faith-Based and Charitable Initiatives (WHOFBCI) because of his prior reputation as an outsider and a nonideologue, quickly was at odds with House Republican leaders who took a highly partisan approach that caused the proposed legislation to be characterized as a reward for religious and politically conservative constituencies. Perhaps ironically, established institutions usually associated with the religious Right tempered their enthusiasm as questions arose regarding federal compliance with employment nondiscrimination (specifically the hiring of gays and lesbians) and as it became apparent that social organizations affiliated with virtually any religion might be eligible to [End Page 313] receive federal funds. The result was passage of a much-emaciated House Resolution 7, with reduced funds and increased restrictions, on July 19, 2001. The Senate version (eventually the Charity Aid, Recovery, and Empowerment [CARE] Act), substantially different from the House language but broadly within the president's desired outcome, had a more promising beginning under the bipartisan leadership of Democrat Joe Lieberman and Republican Rick Santorum. However, the bill hit a significant unexpected roadblock on May 24, 2001, when Jeffords renounced his Republican Party affiliation and majority power in the Senate shifted to the Democrats. The bill never gathered sufficient momentum to come to the Senate floor and officially was laid...

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