Abstract

Elizabeth Spelman has famously argued against gender realism (the view that women have some feature in common that makes them women). By and large, feminist philosophers have embraced Spelman's arguments and deemed gender realist positions counterproductive. To the contrary, Mikkola shows that Spelman's arguments do not in actual fact give good reason to reject gender realism in general. She then suggests a way to understand gender realism that does not have the adverse consequences feminist philosophers commonly think gender realist positions have.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1527-2001
Print ISSN
0887-5367
Pages
pp. 77-96
Launched on MUSE
2006-09-14
Open Access
No
Archive Status
Archived 2009
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