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Reviewed by:
  • Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists
  • Michael Eldridge
Beyond Realism and Antirealism: John Dewey and the Neopragmatists. David L. Hildebrand. The Vanderbilt Library of American Philosophy series. Edited by Herman J. Saatkamp Jr.Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 2003. xii+241 pp. $59.95 h.c. 0–8265–1426–X; $27.95 pbk. ISBN 0–8265–1427–8.

David Hildebrand permits his readers to reorder the chapters of his book, depending on interest. The published order is historical, following an opening introduction. Chapters 2 and 3 deal with Dewey's polemical interactions with [End Page 259] realists and idealists, respectively, during the first half of the twentieth century. Chapters 4 and 5 respectively examine the neopragmatists' interpretations of Dewey and the end-of-the-twentieth-century Putnam-Rorty realism-antirealism debate. The book closes with a chapter with the same title as the book. Although Hildebrand begins with Dewey, the focus of the book is on the adequacy of the neopragmatists' interpretation of Dewey, as well as the neopragmatic proposed third way beyond realism and antirealism (ix). It is because of this focus that he thinks those primarily interested in neopragmatism may prefer to start with chapters 4 and 5 then return to chapters 2 and 3 to appreciate the Deweyan background. But with either reading, Hildebrand expects one will read the whole book, and certainly the concluding chapter with its defense of the Deweyan third way.

This permissiveness on the part of the author and its pragmatic endorsement of interest-determined reading encouraged me to imagine a third ordering, one guided by my own interest in a clear statement of the Deweyan alternative. I quickly found several sections that got me to the heart of the Deweyan proposal. I began with Hildebrand's account of Dewey's understanding of nature as extending beyond our current knowledge but as having been changed by our knowledge (59–61). This prepared the way for the vitally significant having-knowing distinction and a discussion of "the philosophic fallacy" (61–65). Then I included the interchange between C. I. Lewis and Dewey (66–76), with its introduction of "the practical starting point" or PSP, which is central to Hildebrand's project. I next extracted from the fourth chapter a few pages in which Hildebrand brings out more clearly what Dewey means by "had experience." Finally I closed with the sixth chapter and its straightforward presentation of Hildebrand's defense of the Deweyan approach.

This gives one a grasp of the Deweyan alternative, which runs something like this: We find ourselves in the midst of things. To understand who we are, what is real, and how we should act, we begin where we are—and not with fixed theories of reality and action. To be sure, we will make use of some theory or intellectual tools to make sense of what we are about, but we will neither invest these tools with too much ontological status nor take what we learn from using these tools as being full or complete knowledge of the stuff with which we are concerned. Rather we will identify our problems and resolve them as we proceed. The situations in which we find ourselves are real enough—we experience them (or have them)—but our knowledge of them is limited and certainly revisable. It is the standing temptation of philosophers to take what they have produced and read it back into the antecedent reality ("the philosophic fallacy").

Perhaps Hildebrand would sanction this more radical reordering provided one then read what had been initially omitted. It would not seem that he could object on pragmatic grounds, for my ordering, like the other two, is interest-driven. He might point out that my selections are not the only ones that should [End Page 260] be included, and I would welcome his suggestions as to how to develop my own answer-focused approach.

But is pragmatism adequately served by being reduced to interest satisfaction? I think not, and neither does Hildebrand, for, as he masterfully shows, pragmatism context must be taken into account. This is why, on whichever ordering one selects, she or he must sooner or later rehearse the...

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