Dayton Accords: Symbol of Great-Power Failings

Celebrations in 2005 of the tenth anniversary of the signing of the Dayton Accords, joined in by Democrats and Republicans, stressed the "success" of the US-Bosnian policies. Yet, if truth be told, Dayton would have never been needed if certain steps had been taken earlier. Declarations of success should not camouflage failings. Whatever the future may bring, important past historical events should not be buried. What might have been can be constructive.

The civil wars in Yugoslavia were made inevitable by the premature recognition of the secessionist republics by the Western powers. US secretary of state James Baker personally warned the Slovene and the Croat leaders that if they seceded unilaterally, there would be war, but they ignored his admonition. The Slovenes acted first, and in the words of one-time US ambassador to Yugoslavia John Scanlan, they fired the first shots in the civil war when they shot down a Yugoslav army helicopter.

Following intense German pressure, the European powers agreed to the recognition of Slovenia and Croatia, in January 1992. Soon thereafter, the United States declared that it, too, would recognize Slovenia and Croatia, provided Bosnia-Herzegovina was also recognized. Secretary Baker seemingly forgot that he had once declared that the United States would extend diplomatic recognition to the secessionist republics only when a general political settlement had been reached.

It might be added that the secessions were in violation of the Yugoslav constitution, and that at least Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina did not meet well-established international conditions to qualify for recognition.

When the Slovenes announced their secession in mid-1991, they seized control of boundary and custom posts from the federal authorities. The Yugoslav government in Belgrade, presided over by a Croat, ordered the Yugoslav armed forces to retake those posts, an effort that did not succeed, in large part because the armed forces were reluctant to kill fellow Yugoslavs. Moreover, both Croats and Slovenes had significantly sabotaged Yugoslav army facilities in their republic.

Because the media usually blamed the Serbs for the civil wars, it is important to note that at the time of the secessions the Yugoslav government was almost totally in the hands of non-Serbs. The prime minister was Ante Marcovic, a Croat, and the foreign minister was another Croat, Budimir Loncar. The minister of defense and supreme commander, General Veljko Kadijevic, was the son of a Serb-Croat marriage. The deputy commander of the armed forces, Stane Brovet, was a Slovene. And the chief of the air force was Zvonko Jurjevic, another Croat. Those who blame Slobodan Milosevic ignore the fact that he was not part of the Yugoslav government at the time.

Probably the most tragic of the Yugoslav wars was the conflict in Bosnia. The first part of the tragedy lies in the fact that before any violence had occurred, the Serbian, Bosnian, and Croatian leaders had reached an agreement that Bosnia should be divided into three constituent units. This was done in Lisbon in February 1992, facilitated by the European Community's organization, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY). But after a visit in March by US ambassador Warren Zimmermann, the Bosnian Muslim leader repudiated his acceptance of the agreement. The ambassador denied charges that he had advised the Muslim leader to renege. But veteran New York Times correspondent David Binder, after a thorough study of the matter, did not find Zimmermann's denial convincing. The EC mediator, Jose Cutileiro, who had brokered the Lisbon talks, simply blamed "well-meaning outsiders who thought they knew better."¹

Following the outbreak of hostilities, the ICFY worked out several possible peace plans, first under the leadership of former US secretary of state Cyrus Vance and former British foreign secretary David Owen, and subsequently under Lord Owen alone. There is evidence that the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims could have been persuaded to accept each of these plans. Regretfully, each was vetoed by the Clinton administration, and the war continued. According to Lord Owen, "The leaders in Washington bear a heavy responsibility, too, for prolonging the war, with miserable consequences."^2...