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Mediterranean Quarterly 17.1 (2006) 16-22



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Pax Mediterraneo

As Israel's disengagement from the Gaza Strip unravels itself in front of the public, it is clear that this historic move may reignite the Road Map. President George W. Bush and his regional partners have high hopes of treading its muddy waters. But despite its "clear phases, timelines, target dates, and benchmarks aiming at progress through reciprocal steps by the two parties in the political, security, economic, humanitarian, and institution-building fields, under the auspices of the Quartet" intended to move it toward a settlement of the Israel-Palestinian conflict, the Road Map lacks the appropriate foundations and environment to cultivate the seeds of peace so that they actually grow. A broader, more effective solution might entail creating a comprehensive culture of peaceful coexistence through communication on a regional basis—the Mediterranean region.

Before the Road Map can be followed, its prologue—Israel's disengagement from Gaza, the Palestinians' fight against terror, the release of Palestinian detainees, and the opening of roadblocks—is already an exercise in incremental steps. It is foreseeable that we may not jump the hurdles of violent opposition before we even reach the Road Map's starting point.

Indeed, the cycle of violence lives in our collective memories. It is not hard to imagine the process being stalled by Palestinian terror activity by Hamas and Islamic Jihad or by Israeli violence against both Palestinians and Israelis who see dismantling the settlements as a doomsday scenario. Such violence is set against a regional backdrop where some countries enhance [End Page 16] their stability with the tool of terrorism and the development of weapons of mass destruction. Finding the incentive for a society to abandon the option of violence and embrace peace has become critical and will be inspired only by a social, political, and cultural atmosphere that is ready for a change in perception.

Although important progress is being made regarding the Gaza disengagement—the Palestinian Authority is enjoying support from the international community, alternative arrangements have been made for the settlers, and the Gaza disengagement envoy James Wolfensohn is busy financing development projects—and the streets of the Road Map have been paved with good intentions, chances of it reaching fruition are small. Engaging in this race between progress and detriment, security versus terrorism, a two-state conflict versus a two-state solution, we begin again to climb a descending escalator; binary perceptions are clearly not the answer.

Prior Paths to Peace

In the past thirty years Israel has signed various full or interim peace agreements with virtually all its neighbors: the peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979, the treaty of peace between Israel and Jordan in 1994, and the various Oslo agreements signed by Israel and the Palestinian Authority during the years between 1993 and 1995. Even so, the Middle East remains a hostile environment. Indeed, peaceful coexistence in this region should be considered a cultural concept rather than a strategic one.

For Israel, the Oslo process was driven fundamentally by strategic considerations. Israel was concerned with resolving demographic concerns driven by a declining birthrate within the Green Line and an ever-increasing Palestinian population beyond it, and of course the resolution of the "Palestinian issue," while safeguarding Israeli security. And although the Palestinian side was interested in pursuing the traditional aims of establishing an independent Palestinian state and resolving the issue of the refugees through negotiations rather than violence, the strategy did not suffice.

Other primary aims of Israel included negotiations with Syria and improved relations with Egypt and Jordan. Fostering such relationships reflected Israel's preoccupation with creating a cordon sanitaire vis-à-vis the threat of Islamic [End Page 17] fundamentalism emerging from Iran. The late prime minister Yitzhak Rabin and the then foreign minister Shimon Peres hoped to create a buffer by engaging in dialogue with the Palestinians, Jordanians, Egyptians, Syrians, Lebanese, and possibly even the Persian Gulf states—reconciling common interests against extremism.

The Madrid process that began in 1991 offered a further multilateral strategy. This involved establishing five committees to share concerns and...

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