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Reviewed by:
  • Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa
  • Stephen F. Burgess
Taiser M. Ali and Robert O. Matthews , eds. Durable Peace: Challenges for Peacebuilding in Africa. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004. xvi + 443 pp. Bibliography. Index. $29.95. Paper.

This edited volume stems from a June 2000 conference at the University of Toronto on the challenges of peacebuilding in Africa—a most relevant subject for a continent plagued by insecurity. In their introduction, Ali and Matthews point out that peacebuilding takes longer than mere reconstruction; that conflicts can always reignite, even after a decade or more; and that peacebuilding should make possible the construction of new institutions that lead to open and inclusive political systems and then to economic growth and justice. The editors call for an international institution to take over the lead role that the U.N. Development Programme has played in peacebuilding and to improve on the work of that body.

While Ali and Matthews inveigh against slipshod peacebuilding that can led to the resumption of conflict, it is unfortunate that there is no real consideration in the volume of the kind of peacemaking and peacekeeping operations that are necessary for establishing a cease-fire and keeping it from collapsing. These concepts are in fact considered elsewhere, in their 1999 volume, Civil Wars in Africa: Roots and Resolution. Here their analysis seems disappointing, however, since the editors tend to favor power-sharing in peacebuilding, although research and experience have shown that power-sharing becomes problematic over time and that a transition should be made to majority rule as quickly as possible.

Ali and Matthews pose five sets of questions that are addressed in the country case studies. First, what were the results of peacemaking? Second, [End Page 208] what was the nature of the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of combatants and the reconstruction process? Third, was the peacebuilding process a success or failure? Fourth, what was the role of the international community? Fifth, what was the nature of leadership in the peacebuilding process? The country case study chapters are organized around the ways in which the conflicts ended, either in victory for one side or a negotiated settlement. In the cases of victory, peacebuilding is the concern of the victors and not of the international community. Therefore victory provides fewer useful lessons than cases of negotiated settlement where, increasingly, U.N. agencies, regional organizations, and NGOs have become involved. A better way to organize such a volume might have been around the book's theme of peacebuilding as a long-term project. Thus cases of success (South Africa, Mozambique, and Ethiopia) versus short-term failure (Liberia, Somalia, and Angola) could have been considered, followed by cases of failure in the long term (Zimbabwe and Sudan).

The inclusion of the Somalia case is questionable, since there was no cease-fire and therefore no opportunity for peacebuilding. Another chapter attempts to compare two excessively different cases, Sudan and Angola. Sudan's long-term peacebuilding failure (1972–83) was internally driven, while Angola's failure in the 1990s was almost immediate and partly driven by the U.N. Also, the case of successful peacebuilding in Namibia should have been included. Another organizational problem is that the thematic chapters on development and structural deficits and institutional adaptations, which would have been useful at the beginning of the book, have been relegated to the end of the book.

The case of Mozambique epitomizes successful international and national efforts at peacebuilding. Alexander Costy's case study adds to other analyses of a country that was devastated by war and made a remarkable comeback, with three democratic elections since 1994 and one of the fastest growth rates in Africa. Key factors were acceptance by both parties of the peacebuilding process led by the U.N. and Italy that started in 1992 and international assistance to convert RENAMO from a brutal insurgent movement to a political party. Also, economic reforms advised by the IMF and the World Bank were painful but helped bring rapid and sustained economic growth. Decentralization and the provision of some power to RENAMO were wise moves and supported by donors. However, peacebuilding has not been without problems. Ordinary...

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