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  • War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom, and: Warfare in Ancient Egypt
  • Antonio Santosuosso
War in Ancient Egypt: The New Kingdom. By Anthony J. Spalinger . Malden, Mass.: Blackwell Publishing, 2005. ISBN 1-4051-1373-3. Maps. Photographs. Illustrations. Notes. General bibliography. Index. Pp. xx, 291. $29.95.
Warfare in Ancient Egypt. By Bridget McDermott . Stroud, U.K.: Sutton Publishing. 2004. ISBN 0-7509-3291-0. Illustrations. Appendixes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. xi, 212. £20.00.

Anthony J. Spalinger's War in Ancient Egypt leaves the reader puzzled at times but there is no doubt that this work is a valuable source for historians interested in the 600 years of warfare of the New Kingdom. That period coincides with the reign of Ramesses II, one of the most charismatic pharaohs (but not the greatest warrior; that, in my view, was Thutmose III), with Megiddo and Kadesh, two of the best known battles of the Ancient Near East, and with the triumph and eventual decline of Egyptian imperialism. Spalinger argues that the early XVIII Dynasty was a transitional period in military terms.

Originally the navy was the backbone of both conquest and defense. Ships on the Nile allowed the pharaoh's soldiers to respond quickly to any threat, especially in Upper Egypt but also in Lower Egypt. The navy remained an important instrument in the expulsion of the Hyksos, an Asiatic people perhaps from Transjordan, as Donald R. Redford thinks, or maybe from a more northerly location between Palestine and Lebanon, as Spalinger seems to argue. Later, ships continued to be a commercial and at times a military lifeline between the Delta and the Near Eastern coast, Crete, Cyprus, and southern Anatolia. But after the expulsion of the Hyksos, chariotry became the main agent in the establishment of Egyptian supremacy over the Ancient Near East. It became the most prestigious sector of the military, closely associated to the pharaoh who saw the army as a direct expression of his power. Occupation of the highest military posts was a privilege of a hierarchy of landowners whose independence, however, was closely controlled by the pharaoh. Fighting for the state, the pharaoh, and the god Amun were intertwined in the belief that the function of war was the suppression of chaos.

Spalinger's book, which is also valuable for the bibliographical excursi at the end of each chapter, should be read in conjunction with Donald B. Redford (Egypt, Canaan, and Israel in Ancient Times [Princeton, N.J., 1992]) in order to have a more complete picture of the times. The strength of Spalinger's work is its wealth of information and scholarly treatment of aspects, logistics most of all, usually ignored or superficially treated in accounts of the warfare of Ancient Egypt; its weakness lies, however, in the same abundance of details, repeated too often—an approach that leaves the reader asking for conclusions which never arrive or, if they do arrive, are too cryptic. More careful editing would have solved this problem.

Normally it is quite easy to agree with Spalinger's views. Yet there are also conclusions which are quite debatable or wrong. For instance, Ramesses, Spalinger says, "won the battle [of Kadesh]; his tactics were [End Page 207] superb" (p. 226). That conclusion is surprising to say the least. Most historians agree that the battle was an Egyptian defeat or a draw or at best a pyrrhic victory (on this, see my analysis of the evidence and the views of other historians in "Kadesh Revisited: Reconstructing the Battle Between the Egyptians and the Hittites," Journal of Military History 60 [1996]: 423–44). In the aftermath of the encounter the Hittites extended their dominion: they kept Kadesh and imposed their supremacy southward into Upe and Damascus. It is likely that the endless repetition of the battle on the walls of Ramesses' temples aimed at symbolizing the close ties between Ramesses and the god Amun and at reaffirming that the pharaoh survived in spite of his mistakes during the campaign. The truth is that Ramesses never dared to move on Kadesh afterwards.

Bridget McDermott's book is an alternative presentation of ancient Egyptian warfare. Unlike Spalinger, McDermott begins her story around 3200 BC...

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