Issues in the Semantics and Pragmatics of Disjunction (review)

This book, a slightly revised version of the author’s (1998) Cornell University doctoral dissertation, deals with disjunction in English. The aim is to account for the discourse properties and felicity conditions of disjunction, and to use this account in explaining the behavior of presupposition projection and of cross-clausal anaphora in disjunctive sentences. Simon’s account is based on Robert Stalnaker’s model of presupposition and assertion. Throughout the dissertation, S critically examines the dynamic semantic theories which have hitherto been proposed to account for cross-clausal anaphora and presupposition projection, and compares them to her own account based on a pragmatic view of context change. She argues that the pragmatic view provides more satisfactory accounts of the phenomena in question.

There are five chapters in the book. Ch. 1, ‘Introduction’ (3–26), starts with an overview, where S introduces the type of data puzzles the work needs to address, as illustrated by 1 vs. 2 and 3 vs. 4.

(1) Jane owns a red truck or she owns a blue truck.

(2) *Jane owns a truck or she owns a red truck.

(3) Either there’s no bathroom in this house, or it’s in a funny place.

(4) *Either there’s a bathroom in this house, or it’s in a funny place.

Next, the author discusses in detail the Stalnakerian framework that she purports to adopt. For comparison, the outlines of the major theories of dynamic semantics are also discussed.

Ch. 2, ‘Disjunctive sentences in discourse’ (27–79), presents an enrichment of the Stalnakerian framework, which is used to formulate a more precise account of the discourse function and felicity conditions of disjunction on the basis of two pragmatic principles: the relevant informativity condition and the simplicity condition. Ch. 3, ‘Presupposition projection’ (81–124), asks just how a disjunction inherits the elementary presupposition of its disjuncts, when it does not do so, and why. The chapter begins with a critical examination of the CCP (context change potential)-based accounts and shows that they cannot account for the projection data. S then goes on to show how the projection properties of disjunction can be accounted for within the Stalnakerian framework, using Rob van der Sandt’s insights (Context and presupposition, London: Croom Helm, 1988).

Ch. 4, ‘Internal anaphora’ (125–79), deals with anaphora between a quantificational antecedent in one disjunct and a pronoun in another, called internal anaphora. Having discussed the existing accounts in dynamic semantic theories, S presents a version of the E-type account of cross-clausal anaphora, based closely on Stephen Neale’s work (Descriptions, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1990). The aim of Ch. 5, ‘External anaphora’ (181–237), is to account for a new set of anaphora data, called external anaphora, as shown in 5 and 6, which involve pronouns outside of a disjunction that are anaphoric on NPs inside of it. This chapter develops a revised version of the E-type account presented in Ch. 4.

(5) A soprano or an alto will sing. She will be accompanied on the piano.

(6) Jane or George will sing. HE is an interesting performer.

The chapter ends with a discussion of the other existing approaches to external anaphora and concludes that no one theory can successfully account for everything. In the ‘Concluding remarks’ (239–42), S summarizes the thesis, with a suggestion that the project may be extended to other logical operators.