Abstract

Cognitive models of the Capgras delusion differ on two important dimensions. First, models differ on whether they propose that the Capgras belief represents an abnormal explanation of a disordered experience, or the content of a delusional experience. Second, models can include or omit a conjoint abnormality in belief processing. This yields four possible categories of account of the Capgras delusion. It is argued here that each is currently inadequate to explain all features of the delusion. Some suggestions are made for future research directions.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3303
Print ISSN
1071-6076
Pages
pp. 143-151
Launched on MUSE
2005-11-22
Open Access
No
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