In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

Reviewed by:
  • Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance
  • Arthur Jay Klinghoffer
Warren Bass , Support Any Friend: Kennedy’s Middle East and the Making of the U.S.-Israel Alliance. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003. 336 pp. $30.00.

Since the Six-Day War in June 1967, the United States and Israel have had a close relationship, including extensive U.S. military and economic support for the Jewish state. However, is it possible that 1967 may represent not a distinct turning point but the culmination of a gradual process? Warren Bass, a historian who served as associate editor of Foreign Policy, responds in the affirmative as he traces the evolution of U.S.-Israeli ties during the Kennedy administration and convincingly demonstrates that the seeds of an alliance had been planted earlier in the decade. Israel had sought a strategic relationship with the United States since the early 1950s but, after having been rebuffed by Dwight Eisenhower, it started to find support from John F. Kennedy, who proffered security guarantees and armaments.

Bass portrays the Eisenhower administration as "the least pro-Israel presidency in American history" (p. 48). He argues that Eisenhower sought Arab backing for his [End Page 155] anti-Soviet containment policy and therefore opposed any defense relationship with or sale of weapons to Israel. Eisenhower also turned down the request from Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion in 1960 for Hawk anti-aircraft missiles. The only exception, Bass maintains, was the provision in 1958 of 100 recoilless anti-tank rifles. According to Mordechai Gazit, in his book Israeli Diplomacy and the Quest for Peace (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 167, the United States also sold an advanced radar system to Israel in 1960. Gazit served during the early 1960s as a counselor to the Israeli ambassador to the United States, Avraham Harman.

According to Bass, Kennedy worked both sides of the Arab-Israeli fence. While strengthening ties to Israel, he made overtures to Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser as part of a general opening to the Third World. Arab conservatives objected to this aspect of U.S. policy and were especially alarmed when Egyptian troops intervened in Yemen in October 1962. What Bass describes as Nasser's "Vietnam" precipitated a decline in U.S.-Egyptian relations.

The State and Defense Departments during the Kennedy administration were at odds over possible arms sales to Israel. State Department officials argued that the United States should avoid an arms race, whereas the Defense Department cited a need to redress the regional balance of power that had been upset by Soviet deliveries to Arab states. In August 1962, Kennedy sided with the Pentagon and agreed to sell Hawk missiles to Israel. Bass does not explain the financial arrangements, but Gazit asserts (on p. 198 of his book) that generous credits were extended by the United States. This important precedent then led to the Johnson administration's provision of Patton tanks in 1965 and Skyhawk aircraft in 1966.

The Hawk decision was entwined with the issue of Israeli nuclear development at the Dimona reactor. Kennedy was concerned about nuclear proliferation and called for U.S. inspections of the Dimona site. The president also believed that inspections would reduce Egyptian fears of the Israeli nuclear program and make Arab states less prone to turn to the Soviet Union for support. Israel, for its part, denied that it was producing nuclear weapons but did eventually hold open this option for the future. The United States managed to gain Israeli approval for a "visit" to Dimona in May 1961, but not for a schedule of thorough inspections. Nevertheless, Kennedy went ahead with the Hawk sale. Bass concludes that the Hawk and Dimona issues were not directly linked, and he offers persuasive evidence to support his position.

Bass maintains that Israel desired U.S. security guarantees or an association with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. He points out that Kennedy's letter to Ben-Gurion in May 1963 threatened a lack of U.S. commitment to Israel if the Israeli government refused to permit inspections of Dimona. This is indeed an important matter, but the fact...

pdf

Share