Abstract

This paper advances an account of Twardowski as a representationalist. In particular, Twardowskian representationalism is a blend of what I call resemblance representationalism and mediator-content representationalism. It was not, I argue here, proxy-percept representationalism. Twardowski treated mental contents as "signs" or "quasi-pictures." Husserl was a well-known critic of this view. I additionally argue that Husserl's criticism is grounded in the claim that Twardowski conflated representational content with sensations. The distinction on which this Husserlian criticism rests is between the psychological and ideal contents of consciousness, the cornerstone of the early Husserlian phenomenology.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1538-4586
Print ISSN
0022-5053
Pages
pp. 461-480
Launched on MUSE
2005-10-06
Open Access
No
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