Abstract

Moral-theory skepticism not an option in any sort of thinking that could actually be used in resolving dilemmas in applied ethics, since its characteristic doctrines entail positions that in practice often will lead to a kind of paralysis in moral reasoning, where persons faced with having to decide what to do in particularly difficult cases are unable to rule out the most implausible conclusions. Moral-theory skepticism thus makes it difficult to formulate decision-making procedures that will provide guidance in action and, so, seems not to succeed as a fully coherent account of moral reasoning.

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Additional Information

ISSN
1086-3249
Print ISSN
1054-6863
Pages
pp. 279-298
Launched on MUSE
2002-09-01
Open Access
No
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