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  • Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713–1763
  • John A. Dickinson (bio)
Chasing Empire across the Sea: Communications and the State in the French Atlantic, 1713–1763. By Kenneth J. Banks. Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2002. Pp. xvi+319. $55.

Most histories of French colonial expansion during the ancien régime deal with one or the other of the different possessions but very rarely with the empire as a whole. Kenneth Banks's study is innovative in that it addresses specific imperial events in three different Atlantic colonies in order to analyze the impact of communications technology on the transmission of orders and information between metropolitan and colonial authorities. In today's world of virtually instantaneous international communications, it is hard to imagine the constraints faced by administrators of a far-flung empire in the days of sail. Dispatches from the central French administration in Paris and Versailles could easily take several months to reach their destination, and often a whole year would pass before a response was received. This problematic exchange of information limited the French state's effectiveness overseas and severely curbed its ambitions.

The first chapter of Chasing Empire across the Sea presents a fairly traditional account of French colonial endeavors in the Americas from the beginning of the seventeenth century until 1763, when all that was left of a once-burgeoning empire were a few islands in the Caribbean and off Newfoundland. This background is necessary to an understanding of the scope of an empire in formation. The proper administration of empire depended [End Page 642] on efficient transatlantic communications. By studying how the news of the Utrecht treaty reached colonial governors, Banks shows that coordination of the means of communication (shipping) was much more complex than managing the colonies. Although the marine bureaucracy expended considerable energy on mapmaking, port improvement, ship construction, and the training of pilots, climate could not be controlled and—regardless of the ministry's desires—the Saint Lawrence freeze and the hurricane season were major determinants of what could be done with the technology available. Information was transmitted to the colonists through public celebrations that also underlined the hierarchies of elites.

Banks states that the military played a more important role in the colonies than in cities such as Bordeaux, but a more apt comparison would have been with garrison towns on the frontiers. Restrictions on freedom of movement mainly targeted slaves but also affected other elements of the colonial population. Reliance on official discourse cannot, however, be substituted for proof that the problem was real. Given the weakness of the French navy during the first half of the eighteenth century, it is not surprising that merchant vessels carried much official correspondence, especially to the Caribbean, where, Banks argues, this gave merchants greater say in local administration.

Transmission of information was complicated by the parallel structure of colonial authority between civil and military officials, each attempting to assert power through patronage. To make matters even more complex, there were the different views of colonial-born and metropolitan officials. The state was only partially successful in using information to divide these competing groups and was often misled by their reports. Without requisite technology to better control the flow of information, the empire was weak and ultimately fell to Britain.

Even though this book offers an interesting perspective, it is unfortunately marred by many small errors. For example, Champlain had no official capacity when the first Acadian settlements were established, and Port Royal was founded in 1605 not 1604 (p. 15); military support for the colony could not dwindle in the 1650s since there was none (p. 20). Banks often writes about the militia when the context indicates that he should have written troupes de la marine (for example, on p. 112). The superior councils' procureur general du roi was not a minor official (p. 192). Also, for the period under discussion, it is misleading to talk of conflict between civil (robe) and military (sword) officials, because the families controlling these positions were often related and were all members of the minister's clientele.

Although these are matters that do not really...

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