Abstract

Bergen-Belsen concentration camp was set up in spring 1943 on Himmlerís orders with the designated purpose of holding Jews who were to be (temporarily) exempted from deportation to the extermination camps in the East so that they could be exchanged for German civilians held abroad. However, the number of Jews for whom Bergen-Belsen actually proved to be the antechamber to freedom was limited. The British Foreign Office bears some responsibility for this. It regarded proposals from Nazi Germany for such exchanges as blackmail, and giving in to it as unacceptable. It also insisted that the most important task of the anti-Hitler-coalition, and best chance for saving Jews from extermination, was a quick and unconditional victory over Nazi Germany. Instead of pushing for serious negotiations to secure the release of as many Jews as possible, the British Foreign Office played for time. It seems highly likely that a larger number of Jews held at Bergen-Belsen could have been saved if the negotiations about exchange had been conducted with a greater sense of urgency.

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