Vicksburg: The Campaign That Opened the Mississippi (review)

Michael B. Ballard concludes that "it is one of the unfortunate paradoxes of the Civil War that Vicksburg mattered more and is remembered less than many campaigns and battles of distinctly smaller consequence" (p. 430). To resolve this paradox, he seeks to provide a single comprehensive volume on the Vicksburg campaign that is more accessible than Edwin C. Bearss's definitive three-volume treatment (The Vicksburg Campaign, 1985–86) but also something more than the traditional campaign study by Terrence J. Winschel and William L. Shea (Vicksburg is the Key, 2003). To accomplish this goal, Ballard presents a complete picture of the campaign, spanning the full range of civilian-military interaction as well as the more traditional aspects of military history.

While the Trans-Mississippi region was a source of supplies for the Confederacy, Ballard acknowledges that it was never the massive supply depot Jefferson Davis and Abraham Lincoln thought it was. Vicksburg's strategic and military significance stemmed from the fact that both sides invested it with meaning and devoted substantial resources in their respective campaigns to capture or defend it. This explains the author's decision to focus primarily on the city itself and exclude some related operations, such as the Port Hudson campaign; this is an understandable decision given the scope of Union operations in Mississippi in 1862 and 1863. Another valuable facet of this book is that the attention Ballard pays to soldiers and civilians allows him to demonstrate how the interaction between Union soldiers and southern civilians and irregular forces created a cycle of escalation that contributed to the emergence of "hard war" during the Mississippi campaign. Ballard's view of this phenomenon is informed by Mark Grimsley's The Hard Hand of War (1995), but Ballard misses the opportunity to expand on this theme by including more information on how "hard war" became official Union policy in the spring of 1863.

Ballard treats the officers involved on both sides with an even hand, acknowledging their virtues and their faults. While John Pemberton's limitations as a Confederate field commander are laid out in stark relief, Ballard also explains Pemberton's difficulties as a result of problems in the Confederate command structure. John McClernand, on the other hand, is credited for his military abilities, but his acerbic personality is also evident. Ballard also balances his favorable evaluation of Ulysses Grant with an admission of Grant's shortcomings, particularly excessive caution during his fall 1862 invasion of northern Mississippi. But some of these assessments would be more credible if Ballard had examined available manuscript sources. Neither Grant's nor Joseph Johnston's papers are listed in the bibliography. This seems to be a curious oversight given the important roles played by both men in this campaign.

Despite these shortcomings, Ballard has accomplished his goal by crafting an extremely detailed and useful synthesis on the strategic, military, and social aspects of the Vicksburg campaign in a single well-bound volume. This makes his work required reading for anyone whose work or interests relate to the American Civil War.