The Emergence of the Israeli Sephardi Ultra-Orthodox Movement

A salient feature of social change among Israeli Sephardim in the past half century is the fading of particular identities rooted in disparate countries of origin. Currently, the fact that some individuals may be of Tunisian background and others, say, of Moroccan, Tripolitanian, or Persian origin is of much less importance to them than it was decades ago in the generation of mass immigration to Israel. The particular identities rooted in countries of origin tend, among second- and third-generation immigrants, to fade into larger categories—Sephardim (or Mizrahim, Middle Easterners) as against Ashkenazim.¹ Identities rooted in particular countries of origin, such as Ethiopia and countries of the former Soviet Union, are significant mostly for people who are relative newcomers to the country. In this context, the emergence in the past two decades of an Israeli Sephardi ultra-Orthodox movement attracting people of numerous disparate backgrounds is notable.

The new religious movement has aroused the interest of the public and of social observers, particularly in the wake of electoral successes of Shas, the Sephardi ultra-Orthodox party, since the early 1980s. However, the two phenomena—a Sephardi ultra-Orthodox movement and a Sephardi political party—though related, are not identical. The movement encompasses more socioreligious circles than does the party, whereas the party attracts widespread social circles (in particular people who are only mildly religiously observant) that do not pertain to the movement. Certain ideological and academic predilections of Israeli social scientists prevented them in the past from developing much interest in these phenomena, but in the past decade or two Shas has become so prominent that the need to explore at least the political phenomenon has become inescapable. The researchers who now study Shas have raised questions, such as why the party emerged at a particular time and where its social roots lie, and they address the questions primarily with reference to contemporary sociopolitical problems. In this article I am concerned with the religious movement rather than with the related political party. An analogous ultra-Orthodox movement emerged among Ashkenazi Jews in central Europe in the mid-nineteenth century. I address myself to the question of why such a Sephardi movement has recently arisen under the very different conditions of latter-day Sephardim in Israel.

Sephardi Diaspora Religiosity in Comparative Perspective

Israeli Jews of Mediterranean background have variants of Jewish culture, details of which differ from the cultures of Jews of north European background. The differences are often conceptualized by the dichotomy "modern and traditional," and this is indeed a useful starting point to uncover the nature of Sephardi religiosity. Thus, an important feature of the orbit of Sephardi Jewry is the comparatively late development of modern ideologies. In nineteenth-century northern Europe, various religio-ideological positions within Jewry gained political and institutional crystallization. Sometimes communities cleaved and split apart permanently to accommodate various ideological platforms. Numerous political parties, clubs, synagogues, and publications arose out of the efforts of protagonists of various ideological positions. This kind of ideological hyperactivity had no counterpart in Islamic countries and their Jewish communities. Even in the largest communities, such as Baghdad, Tunis, and Salonica, where incipient class-formation occurred, there was no social agitation comparable to that in contemporary Jewish communities in northern Europe.

Traditional life among Jews of Islamic lands until the late nineteenth century was as stable as was Ashkenazi Jewish life up to the eighteenth century. And many Mediterranean Jewish communities remained relatively unshaken as late as the time of mass emigration in the mid-twentieth century. Indeed, the shoots of European ideological innovations, such as "Hebrew enlightenment," assimilation to Western culture, secularization, and Zionism did eventually reach Sephardi communities. But these influences came late and most unevenly (primarily to communities near the major ports, and much less to inland communities). Some of the major European Jewish movements, such as the leftist secular workers' movements, had very little presence anywhere in the Orient,² Baghdad and Salonica somewhat excepted. Even more significant than the late appearance of ideological modernity on the Sephardi scene is the fact that whatever did eventually develop...