Firearms: A Global History to 1700 (review)

This book sets out its aims very early on. It is an attempt to answer the question, "Why was it the Europeans who perfected firearms when it was the Chinese who invented them?" Beginning with this seemingly simple query, Kenneth Chase proceeds through a detailed consideration of the traditional enemies each culture or people fought against. Put most simply, Chase's argument is that in those areas of the world where the traditional foe was horse-riding nomads, essentially light cavalry, firearms were not of any real use. But where large bodies of infantry attacked similarly equipped forces, firearms could afford significant advantage, so they were taken up and developed. Thus, in China, where the principal enemy was nomads from the north and west, firearms were not effective, and though the Chinese developed some they had no real use for them. In Western Europe, where settled, agrarian peoples fought one another, firearms were part of the continuing evolution of weapons and warfare and underwent constant development and improvement. The logistical needs of different armies are crucial to this line of argument. A nomad army, living off the land and highly maneuverable, can move rapidly, while an infantry-based army needs continual supplies of food and fodder and can only march and campaign as long as its supplies hold out. Chase estimates that marching into the desert a traditional infantry-based army could last for as little as ten days before it had to return for further supplies, making it difficult for such a force to take the initiative.

After setting out his thesis in the opening chapter, Chase then develops it for various parts of the world—China, Europe, the lands of Islam, Korea and Japan. For each he considers the broad sweep of history from the twelfth to the eighteenth century and shows where and how his theory fits the known data and where it does not. This broad-brush strategy can be confusing, but there is a real need to show how the use and development of firearms were direct responses to the cultures of those fighting with or against them. Chase offers a commonsensical approach, and it is this perhaps above all else that convinces. In the current corpus of arms and armor studies or military history this volume stands out for its individualism and scope. Chase offers an answer to his basic question and then shows how it applies to conflicts from the introduction of firearms down to the eighteenth century. A convincing argument is sustained throughout the work.

There are a few caveats. Chase's use of the term "firearm" for all forms of gunpowder weapon is sometimes confusing; most often he is referring to small arms rather than any form of artillery. Unfortunately, too, he has had to rely on secondary sources for his sketchy description of the development of firearms and all their attendant problems. However, his thesis is not dependent on specific firearms or on exactly how and when different types developed. Chase is more concerned with broad themes, and here he excels. Few works on military history do what Chase manages to do here, develop a specific theory in its widest possible context.