Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam (review)

Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam. By FREDRIK LOGEVALL. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999 . Pp. 557 . $40 .00 (cloth); $19 .95 (paper).

Twenty-five years after the fall of Saigon, why the United States became involved in Vietnam remains clouded in mystery. No matter how often authors have attempted to answer the question, there still exists no consensus on the issue. Economic, ideological, political, and military considerations among others have been suggested as potential reasons by different authors in sometimes quite convincing accounts. George McT. Kahin's Intervention: How America Became Involved in Vietnam is particularly successful in presenting a balanced account of the origins of the American military commitment in Vietnam. But the debate continues.

In Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam, Fredrik Logevall tackles the issues from a fresh perspective. Part of a new generation of diplomatic historians who practice multi-archival research, Logevall draws on the documentary records of Canada, France, England, and Sweden--in addition to the United States --to present a history of the origins of the American military commitment to South Vietnam that carefully considers the international context.

Logevall contends that the American course in Vietnam was set during what he calls "The Long 1964 ," that is between August 1963 and February 1965 . Unlike many who have written on the subject, Logevall does not believe that war was preordained or inevitable. Although the United States had been involved in Vietnam since 1945 , at no time had a "point of no return" been reached. During "The Long 1964 ," however, the American leadership took fateful decisions that resulted in the overt military commitment of 1965 . War, Logevall contends, was a conscious and deliberate choice. Kennedy, and more so Johnson, rejected numerous opportunities to avoid war in Vietnam--in fact sabotaged peace initiatives orchestrated by foreign governments, including Hanoi--because they felt that armed confrontation with communist insurgents was the most desirable contingency under the circumstances existing at the time. So intent were Kennedy and Johnson to "fight it out" in Vietnam that they sanctioned the ousting of South Vietnamese leaders who refused to share that position. Logevall purports that Kennedy and Johnson urged the overthrow of the Ngo Dinh Diem and Duong Van Minh regimes respectively because those administrations did not satisfactorily recognize the necessity of war and the futility of negotiations.

Why did they choose war? According to Logevall, the key consideration behind the decision was credibility. At stake was not only American credibility, but that of the Democratic party and, most significantly, that of LBJ. Johnson had serious misgivings about his flair as a statesman. His insecurity was such that it caused him to abhor interaction with foreign officials and debate over foreign policy issues with his own staff. Motivated by the fear of personal humiliation that would come with failure in Vietnam, Johnson opted for a military solution as the one that stood the best chance of bringing swift and decisive success. In Logevall's book, Johnson is not portrayed as the tragic liberal reformer who had to sacrifice Great Society programs and get involved in Vietnam to satiate the hawkish aspirations of fellow Americans; instead, he is a dedicated, cold warrior, one who mourned the "loss" of China and believed that victory in Vietnam was important not for the realization of his domestic agenda but for the sake of victory itself.

Although Vietnam was, from the American perspective, largely Johnson's war--Kennedy having been assassinated at the outset of "The Long 1964 "--others share the blame. The other members of the "Awesome Foursome," that is, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and National Security Adviser McGeorge Bundy, were instrumental in getting LBJ to act on Vietnam. They, as much as Johnson, favored war because it...