Inside the Cuban Revolution: Fidel Castro and the Urban Underground (review)

Julia Sweig has written a must-read book for Cubanists. Inside the Cuban Revolution takes an in-depth look at the revolutionary struggles of the 1950s using documents in Cuban archives never before accessed by scholars as well as interviews with Armando Hart, Ricardo Alarcón, Faure Chomón, Enrique Oltuski, and fifteen other veterans of the July 26 Movement (M267). The author claims to have debunked three myths about how and why Batista fell. The first and third are crucial and interconnected: the centrality of the Sierra Maestra in the struggle and the supreme prominence of Fidel Castro within the M267. The urban underground (el Llano) and its leaders, especially Frank País, are the stars of her narrative.

Sweig has documented the well-known tensions between la Sierra and el Llano more richly and solidly than anyone else. At issue was a primal difference over which revolutionary strategy should be given priority: a general strike and an urban-based insurrection to force Batista's resignation or a guerrilla insurgency to demolish the regular army. Castro, of course, favored the latter and underscored el Llano's responsibility for providing la Sierra with weapons and supplies. Even after País's assassination in July 1957, el Llano leaders continued to pursue the strategy of urban insurrection while tending to la Sierra's constant demands. That the primary sources Sweig consulted corroborate that Castro managed to get a stranglehold on the M267 only after the failed strike of April 9, 1958, is a significant contribution to Cuban studies. After April 1958, la Sierra's strategy was paramount. Until then, however, the two wings of the M267 functioned with relative autonomy.

During the 1950s, Batista's opponents were of two minds: those who favored an electoral road map out of the national crisis and those who insisted on revolutionary violence against the dictator. The M267 unequivocally rejected the first, the politiquería that inevitably accompanied it being a central reason. El Llano's urban-based strategy, however, required an outreach to other opposition forces that la Sierra's did not. Only when he could dictate the terms of engagement (Sierra Pact, 1958) did Castro fully sanction this outreach. When mapping the convoluted pacts among opposition sectors and the eventual ascendance of Castro, the Rebel Army, and M267 in the anti-Batista struggle, Inside the Cuban Revolution shines. Of particular interest is Sweig's focus on the urban M267's work with labor groups—except those affiliated with the Popular Socialist Party (PSP)—in preparation for the strike of 1958.

While partly recognizing the political significance of el Llano's strategy, she does not fully grasp its profound implications. Had Batista resigned under the gun of a successful urban insurrection, el Llano would have been in a stronger position, and, consequently, different political dynamics would have likely driven the revolution's first year. Anticommunism was more pervasive among el Llano members, and the PSP, therefore, may not have gained the prominence it did. A successful urban insurrection would also have carried a victory more widely shared within the M267 and with other groups. El Llano had many more members and a more collective leadership than la Sierra; an April 9, 1958, that bore fruits would have required closer cooperation with a broader swathe of the opposition.

Sweig falters badly when she construes her second "myth": the importance of 1959. Watershed though it was, she declares its true context to be Cuba's quest for independence since the nineteenth century. This, of course, is the dominant paradigm of Cuban historiography, which she embraces as an article of faith. Unlike the other two myths, she brings to bear neither evidence nor argument on this one. Her understanding of Cuban history is superficial and marred by factual errors or unwarranted characterizations. Examples of factual errors: Carlos Hevia, not Ramón Grau, was the Auténtico presidential candidate in 1952 (5); elections were scheduled for June, not November...