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  • Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War
  • Donald J. Mrozek
Afterburner: Naval Aviators and the Vietnam War. By John Darrell Sherwood. New York: New York University Press, 2004. ISBN 0-8147-9842-X. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Pp. x, 352. $32.95.

In the prologue to Afterburner, author John Darrell Sherwood forthrightly states that "those expecting a traditional official history might be disappointed with this book" (p. 5). Precisely what readers do get may be debated. Sherwood claims that the bombing effort in the Vietnam War during the period between 1968 and 1972 was the most controversial phase, and he seeks to fill what he sees as a gap in coverage of the air war by focusing on the efforts of twenty-one Navy fliers in that period, asserting that they form a "cross-section of the personnel who fought in the Navy's air war over Vietnam" (p. 3). Coverage includes the bombing of the Ho Chi Minh Trail and efforts to interdict the flow of supplies into the south, the emergence of the naval flight officer, issues pertaining to prisoners of war, mining operations at Haiphong, air-to-air combat and the impact of Top Gun, and naval aviators' role in responding to the North Vietnamese Easter Offensive of 1972. Sherwood also makes broad assertions about the importance and impact of the bombing effort and about other issues such as the relative contribution of Air Force and Navy air efforts.

Sherwood says that a strict chronology "would serve no purpose except to produce lethargy for the reader" (p. 5), which, coupled with his disclaimer that this is not a traditional official history, might seem like a challenge to that form of historical study. Similarly, although he indicates that he has used some documents such as intelligence reports, Sherwood considers his work to be an example of "'new' military history based on oral history" (p. 5)—in essence, twenty-one biographical portraits form the heart and core of this book.

In the end, the aspiration to "cover" the air war in Vietnam from 1968 to its conclusion is not fulfilled. There is no way for the reader to tell if the case of pilot James J. McBride is "typical," thus justifying his dominant role in several chapters. Nor, later, can we really tell whether Leighton Smith, later a flag officer, qualifies as characteristic or exceptional. The further the reader gets into the text, the harder it is to question the principle by which the cases considered in this book have been selected. Did the accessibility of the information (whether in documentary form or in available interviews) determine the framework of the book as a whole? There are lively descriptions of incidents, whether entailing clashes of personality or combat experiences, yet the final impression is anecdotal.

Nor is it entirely clear why biographical sketches merit recognition as "new" military history. Indeed, biographically centered coverage and battle history together constitute the bulk of the most stereotypically "old" military history. The genuinely new military history runs counter to the notion that one can, "from one, know all." Truly effective social history of the military is premised on analysis that more likely reveals the counterintuitive and runs contrary to expectation, stereotypical or otherwise. [End Page 605]

In Afterburner, Sherwood makes many useful observations, such as acknowledging that the bombing of North Vietnam in Linebacker II late in 1972 had to do with South Vietnamese intransigence in negotiation as well as with that of the North Vietnamese. But curious instances of questionable analysis also appear. For example, despite the limits imposed by using biographical sketches, Sherwood makes sweeping claims for an implied superiority of naval aviation over Air Force efforts in 1972 based largely on sortie generation and amount of tonnage dropped (p. 261), albeit noting that "ironically" the Air Force "downed most of the vital targets" of Linebacker II (p. 263). Failure to deal clearly with efficiency versus effectiveness seems an almost weird step backward. Also, by the end of the work, the author lets loose a number of arguable propositions for which no shred of evidence is offered: for example, that air crews who flew the missions in...

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