The Once and Future Army: A History of the [Australian] Citizen Military Forces, 1947-1974 (review)

Peacetime armies get little historical coverage compared to their wartime counterparts, and peacetime citizen reserve forces even less. This is puzzling. In the wars of the twentieth century the American National Guard, British Territorial Army, and Australian Militia often made a greater numerical contribution than the regular armies. Dayton McCarthy tells the story of a part-time reserve organization that was never tested in war, Australia's Citizen Military Forces (CMF).

Australia was defensively weak after 1945. The Cold War led to the creation of the CMF, which was largely staffed with World War II veterans. Despite many problems, by the mid-1950s the CMF had been built up to over 80,000 men. In many ways, it was the most efficient peacetime volunteer force in the country's history. The CMF far outweighed the small Australian Regular Army (ARA), both in numbers and in its place in defense planning. The heyday of the CMF was brief, however. The CMF first lost its primary role to the ARA, and in the early 1960s it was catastrophically disrupted by the end of national service and the adoption of the unworkable "Pentropic" divisional organization. National service was restored, but the government never dared to send the CMF to Vietnam. Instead, the force filled up with national servicemen who chose to serve at home. Deprived of a meaningful role, the CMF was weak and demoralized by the end of the Vietnam era.

It is sobering to be reminded of all the military fashions that have come and gone in Australia since 1945. Australian defense policy has gone through repeated cycles of overseas commitment and retrenchment, and this was reflected in the history of both the CMF and its pre-1945 predecessor, the Australian Militia. The only constant was Australia's persistent emotional—almost ideological—commitment to the citizen soldier or "gifted amateur" concept, and the equally consistent refusal of Australian governments to provide the resources to make that concept workable. The CMF encountered the same problems that had undermined the Militia: inadequate equipment and training, high turnover, failure to use the manpower of rural areas, low pay, and poor cooperation from employers. Lip service was paid to the "One Army" concept, but the ARA remained hostile to the CMF. Despite the lessons of the Second World War, until 1964 the Australian government refused to modify the Defence Act to allow the CMF to serve outside Australian territory. According to McCarthy, the Howard government has finally learned from history, and the current Australian Army Reserve is a really useful adjunct to the ARA. Whether this force can withstand the pressure of long service in distant conflicts like Iraq remains to be seen, however.

This book is a valuable contribution to a neglected area of Australian military history, and it offers many parallels to similar forces like the U.S. National Guard and the Territorial Army in Britain. McCarthy's interpretation of the Pentropic episode may be controversial; he sees it almost as a deliberate attempt by the ARA to sabotage the CMF. The text is rather dry, but both research and writing are well up to the high standard of the Australian Army History Series. This is Mr. McCarthy's first book, and a worthy debut.