Guerrilla: Insurgents, Patriots and Terrorists from Sun Tzu to Bin Laden (review)

Guerrilla is "not a history of guerrilla warfare, but rather a study of some outstanding and brilliant military leaders" who "adapted their guerrilla theories to the particular terrain and situation, or developed new ideas" (p. 6). Accordingly, in 11 chapters, David Rooney narrates the experiences of guerrilla leaders. After locating the origins of guerrilla war in David and Joshua of the Old Testament, Sun Tzu's views, and Welsh resistance to the English, Rooney briefly mentions the eighteenth-century practice of "little war" before moving on to Napoleonic guerrillas in Spain, Russia, and Haiti. Rooney then gets to guerrilla leaders in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries: Garibaldi in South America and Italy, the Boer commandos of South Africa, Michael Collins in Ireland, T. E. Lawrence and Arabia, Mao, Tito, and British unconventional forces in World War II under Michael Calvert, David Stirling, and Orde Wingate. He then finishes up with chapters on Che Guevara and Osama bin Laden.

While Rooney's narrative is soundly written and a pleasure to read, problems arise with his analysis, usually just a few references to "guerrilla war" or "guerrilla principles." According to Rooney the principles of guerrilla war are "defeating alien occupation, having a cause to die for, having the support of the people, attacking when least expected and never risking defeat in set battle" (p. 8). Yet, as Rooney notes, these precepts have a long lineage in warfare and are sound principles regardless of whether one is a guerrilla or not. So what makes a guerrilla? As Rooney imagines them, guerrilla warriors fight to "achieve their ultimate aim of removing unjust rule and establishing a new society" under guerrilla leaders opposed to "oppression, injustice or alien occupation" (p. 7). This utopian and romantic view of guerrillas and their leaders severely constrains Rooney's case selection, analysis, and the ultimate value of his work.

If struggling against alien occupation is the key marker of guerrillas then one may understand why Von Lettow-Vorbeck in East Africa during World War I, whom Rooney mentions, did not receive a chapter, but why not Shamil Basayev of the Chechens, for example? Further, Rooney's limited view makes his select bibliography very select indeed, typically three to four works for each chapter. He thus overlooks works by Charles Esdaile and John Mueller that demonstrate the very fine line between banditry and insurgency and suggest that criminal activities are often a stronger motivation than patriotism among many guerrillas and terrorists. Finally, Rooney's chapter on Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda forces one to wonder why he covered just Al-Qaeda and ignored other terrorist organizations such as Hezbollah, Hamas, or the Baader-Meinhof gangs?

Guerrilla does a service by demonstrating the deep historical roots of insurgency and the long existence of terrorism on the continuum of warfare, as Caleb Carr and John Lynn have argued. However, Rooney's romantic and utopian view of guerrillas hinders the usefulness of this work. Far more blunt and realistic assessments of guerrillas and terrorists than this will be needed to convince most readers.