Presidents and the Politics of Agency Design: Political Insulation in the United States Government Bureaucracy, 1946-1997 (review)

"Presidency research," notes King, disapprovingly, "is one of the last bastions of historical, non-quantitative research in American politics"¹ In a highly impressive, well-written study of how agencies in the federal bureaucracy are designed, Lewis has answered King's lament with research that is historical, quantitative, and, in its theoretical foundations, grounded in microeconomics-based rational choice.

Lewis attempts to explain why bureaucratic agencies are created in such different forms, some in ways that enhance presidential control and others in ways meant to insulate them from such control. His point of departure is the Constitution's indeterminacy about the bureaucracy, which forced the presidents and Congress to decide its form agency by agency. Lewis argues that "the design of administrative agencies is political. Agencies are not designed to be effective, rather they are the result of a political bargain among interested parties" in the executive and legislative branches (xi).²

Not surprisingly, presidents prefer new bureaucratic agencies to be responsive to them. They want each new agency to be headed by their own appointees, and they want it housed in a cabinet department or in the Executive Office of the President, both of which are subject to ongoing presidential control. Similarly, Congress prefers to insulate new agencies from direct presidential control through such devices as granting agency heads fixed terms or placing them outside the cabinet and White House.

According to Lewis, presidents almost always want their way in matters of agency design and Congress only sometimes does, the latter having collective-action problems that the former does not. For example, members of Congress who share the president's party affiliation often are more concerned about helping to fulfill their leader's partisan agenda than about asserting the prerogatives of their branch. Such an alliance is especially effective in times of united party government.

Lewis also shows that presidents can use their constitutional authority to act in ways that thwart even an assertive Congress. A veto, or even a veto threat, usually can prevent Congress from trying to impose an insulated new agency on the president. Alternatively, a president sometimes can create an agency through executive action.

Looking at agencies created from 1946 to 1997, Lewis uses a variety of impressive and appropriate statistical techniques to explore the circumstances under which presidents prevailed. He fleshes out the quantitative analyses with illustrative case studies from the same era and is forthcoming about the limits of his study, noting that he "downplayed the different politics associated with different types of government functions, and the role that interest groups play" (165).

Finally, Lewis does not shy from offering his opinions on agency design. Conceding that in some cases, such as monetary policy, stability is so important a value that agencies should be insulated from presidential control, he argues that, in general, "a bit more presidential influence in agency design will likely provide efficiency gains in the long run" (161).