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Israel Studies 3.1 (1998) 140-169



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Russia and Israel under Yeltsin

Robert O. Freedman


Introduction

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the rise of Russia as its most important successor state put a new focus on the rapidly changing relations between Moscow and Jerusalem. From the 1967 war until Mikhail Gorbachev began his policy of perestroika twenty years later, Soviet policy-makers viewed Israel as a pariah state. In the latter years of the Gorbachev era, however, there was a major turnabout in Soviet policy toward Israel, and by the time the Soviet Union had collapsed in December 1991, full diplomatic relations had been restored between the two countries and trade had begun to develop. In the subsequent six years, relations between Russia and Israel have had a series of ups and downs. This paper will analyze the evolution of Russian-Israeli relations from the collapse of the USSR in December 1991 until Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov's visit to the Middle East in October 1997. Prior to undertaking this analysis, however, it is necessary to examine both the course of Russian domestic politics during this period and also the often disjointed foreign policy-making process in Russia, since both factors have had a significant impact on Russian foreign policy toward Israel. In addition, a review will be made of the new regional priorities in Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East, so as to put Russian-Israeli relations in the proper perspective.

Russia's Foreign Policy-Making Processes and Priorities

Domestic Politics

While in most democratic countries, domestic politics play a significant role in foreign policy, in Russia, a country that only became democratic at the end of 1991, domestic politics have become particularly central in Russian foreign policy-making, not only toward the Middle East, but toward the [End Page 140] world as a whole. For this reason an overview of the main thrust of Russian politics since 1991 will be presented, with particular focus on its affect on foreign policy-making.

The impact of domestic politics on Russian foreign policy toward the Middle East is clearly illustrated by the shift of Russian policy from a strong pro-Western tilt in 1992 to a highly nationalist thrust in 1996, a process punctuated by the January 1996 replacement of Andrei Kozyrev by Yevgeny Primakov as Foreign Minister. During this period, Yeltsin's foreign policy tacked with the political winds of Russia, particularly after the December 1993 Duma elections, when, instead of openly confronting the new Duma as he had its predecessor, Yeltsin chose to try to adapt to its highly nationalistic foreign policy priorities. This was a pattern of behavior he was to repeat when a still more nationalist, and this time communist-dominated, Duma was elected in December 1995. Yeltsin's tactics worked, since he was reelected President in July 1996. In March 1997, however, having returned to office following heart surgery and a bout of pneumonia, he again shifted his position, appointing key moderates to leading positions in the Russian government and moderating Russian foreign policy as well.

Stage One: A Pro-American Approach

The first stage of foreign policy during Kozyrev's tenure covered the year 1992 and was clearly characterized as a pro-American direction. Thus Russia joined in enforcing the sanctions against Iraq by dispatching two warships to the Persian Gulf; it supported sanctions against Libya (where the Russian Embassy was attacked because of its support of United States policy); and Russia was an enthusiastic supporter of the Arab-Israeli peace process. As far as the countries of the former Soviet Union were concerned—the "near abroad," in Russian parlance, where 25 million Russians lived—Kozyrev took the lead in calling for normal diplomatic relations, discarding Moscow's old, imperial behavior—an attitude strongly supported by the United States. Only in the case of arms sales to Iran did Russia take a position markedly different from that of the United States.

By December 1992, however, Yeltsin's relatively free hand in foreign policy was being challenged in the Russian Parliament, where three main groups vied...

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