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Israel Studies 3.1 (1998) 273-276



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Michael Cohen—Fighting World War Three from the Middle East:
Allied Contingency Plans 1945-1955

Uri Bialer
(frank Cass, London, 1997)


PROFESSOR MICHAEL COHEN IS A veteran scholar of British strategy and diplomacy in the Middle East during the Mandate, especially on the question of Palestine, and his works have contributed profoundly toward elucidating the subject. In his new book, Cohen steps beyond the time-reference of his previous studies by taking up two issues central to the decade following World War Two: 1) Anglo-American military plans for defense of the Middle East in the event of a Soviet attack, and 2) mutual relations between the two countries in regional diplomacy. Incorporating an abundance of rich secondary sources, and especially of new documents that reveal the military perspective, Cohen weaves a tale whose main thread is one of frustration, first and foremost by the British, in carrying out their defense policy. Furthermore, despite the circumstances that could have made clear, already in the early 1950s, the lack of realism of the Anglo-American defense plans and their intensive involvement with them continued beyond the period dealt with in the study. It is not surprising, then, to read in the conclusion of his weighty book (349 pages) Cohen's candid observation that raises the same questions that accompanied the writer of these lines during his reading.

In retrospect, Allied contingency plans appear as little short of farce! With the wisdom of hindsight, one might ask now what was the point of it all? Did the planners not realize how far their drawing-board schemes were removed from reality (p. 328)?

The need for defense plans was, nevertheless, absolute. This was because, in the decade after World War Two, an awareness had crystallized in London and Washington that the next big war would break out either as a result of Moscow's decision to invade Europe, including its peripheral [End Page 273] areas, or as a result of uncontrollable escalation in a Soviet-initiated crisis. The danger of this kind of a war was extremely tangible in light of the unquestioned superiority of the Soviets' conventional arsenal, whose size was estimated at the time as much more than it actually was. The nuclear monopoly of the West was not considered a reliable deterrent due to limitations in production capacity and launch capability. The West's ability to prevent war was further reduced following Russia's first nuclear explosion in 1949, which ushered in the era of the "balance of terror" between the two superpowers. In this heightened atmosphere, it was not surprising that the greater part of British and American attention was concentrated on defending Europe.

The Middle East, important as it was, did not play a key role, for obvious reasons, in mutual defense plans. However, the Soviets' capability to take over Middle-Eastern oil reserves and sea lanes (especially the Suez Canal) presented a serious threat to the West. Also, from the outset, the need for a defense scheme contained, ipso facto, the obligation to build offensive systems. This was because British and American military presence in the Middle East, especially in the form of air-power, afforded the possibility of striking at the "soft under-belly" of the Russians with a marked advantage. The combination (of defense and attack) was an axiom in the concept of creating air-bases in the Middle East (in Egypt under British control, and in the "northern zone" by the Americans) which became the main operational goal.

Yet, carrying out this policy proved unsuccessful. Cohen's book relates the pathetic story of Anglo-American inability to handle the totality of problems that led, in 1954 (the final year under discussion) to the collapse of Britain's basic goal of establishing a strategic defense position in the southern zone of the Middle East, an historic pullback which left the American alternative as the only game in town. The main feature of Cohen's analysis lies in its clarification of these circumstances. Among them...

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