Line Drawings: Defining Women through Feminist Practice (review)

Cressida Heyes might appreciate William James' suggestion that "The whole function of philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-formula or that world-formula be the true one" (James 1907, 50). Like James, Heyes is engaged in exploring the interaction of theory and practice, especially toward the improvement of both. In Line Drawings: Defining Women through Feminist Practice, Heyes takes on one of the most dominant issues in contemporary feminist theory, indeed, in philosophy: the problem of essentialism. As Heyes argues with strong scholarly support and sharp insights, essentialism poses a problem, no matter on which side of the debate one falls. Essentialists support the troublesome idea that there is "an essential 'womanness' that all women share" (Heyes 2000, 51), while anti-essentialists are stuck with a philosophy that often provides very little in the way of practical distinctions and definitions that one might find useful in feminist activism and research. Heyes attempts (in a pragmatic move?) to find a "middle ground" to this debate by developing a feminist theory deeply rooted both in her practical experience as an activist and in her interesting appropriation of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. As much as a pragmatic analysis (perhaps as found in the work of James or of contemporary pragmatist-feminists) might contribute to Heyes' project, however, it is decidedly absent.

Heyes begins this work by laying out the problems of essentialism in feminist theory and in philosophy more generally. In outlining biological, metaphysical, and linguistic essentialism, Heyes points out the danger in assuming that there is an essence of womanhood. This is historically evident in Philosophy (Heyes' capitalization), with its quest for purity (as Heyes co-opts Maria Lugones' term). Philosophical traditions that make universal claims, whether about metaphysics or ethics, lend themselves to the exclusion of groups that do not fit into whatever categories of human existence are dominant. Heyes suggests that feminist theory, using many of the same methods as traditional Philosophy, can yield the same unfortunate results. Instead, Heyes wants to "go back to the rough ground," as Wittgenstein writes, of ambiguity and difference, on the one hand, and politically pragmatic generalizations about women, on the other. This is important to feminists, Heyes offers, since they "should be worried about a theoretical trend that risks undermining feminist political action rather than making it more just" (98).

In further developing the theoretical foundation for her project, Heyes discusses essentialism in feminist methodology itself. In its desire to make claims about women's experience, feminist theory often makes what many believe to be unwarranted generalizations. For example, Heyes points to the often criticized ethics of care developed by Carol Gilligan, which suggests that there is a distinctive woman's voice. On the other side of the issue, there are theorists such as Elizabeth Spelman, who contends that such generalization leads to an essentialism that excludes many women, since often the experiences of majority groups (white, middle-class, heterosexual women) stand in for all women. Following this theme, Heyes explores "identity politics" and the fine line between solidarity and exclusion. One benefit of identifying specific interest groups for political purposes is that difference is recognized (such as the uniqueness of the experiences and issues of black women). A danger, however, is that others can be excluded, even when common experiences and interests can be addressed (such as the fact that women as a group are the victims in the vast majority of acts of sexual violence). To mediate arguments between positions of essentialism and anti-essentialism, Heyes explores "anti-anti-essentialism," which admits the dangers of essentialism while also allowing for the possible benefits of the occasional united front that rhetorical generalizing (though always within certain contexts) can provide (especially, as Heyes points out, since there is a difference between universalizing and generalizing). Heyes restates...