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  • The Korean War in World History
  • Peter Lowe
The Korean War in World History. Edited by William Stueck. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2004. ISBN 0-8130-2306-2. Maps. Notes. Index. Pp. 203. $35.00.

This volume comprises five essays, plus an introduction and conclusion contributed by the editor. The subjects pursued focus on the fate of the Korean people between 1945 and 1954; the Soviet role in the Korean conflict; the Chinese response to war in Korea; "Korean Borderlands" in the context of imaginary frontiers of the Cold War; and the economic and strategic impact of the Korean struggle on Japan. All of the authors are "old hands" who have written at length on issues connected with the war in Korea.

Some repetition is unavoidable, yet each essay is lively and vigorously argued. Allen R. Millett examines the political turbulence and instability following on from the surrender of Japan in August 1945. Profound political divisions and factionalism on the left and right of the political spectrum did not encourage confidence in future cohesion: rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union rendered division into two rival states inevitable. Millett provides a lucid account of developments down to 1954, when the powers effectively abandoned attempts to achieve a unified state: [End Page 1306] he sees Syngman Rhee and Kim Il Sung as skilful political operators, outmanoeuvring or (and) eliminating their rivals and utilising assistance from their respective sponsors from among the great powers to consolidate authoritarianism—"The winners, mostly self-defined, were the Korean politicians, not the Korean people" (p. 51).

Kathryn Weathersby discusses the evidence concerning Soviet aims in the light of the most recent evidence to emerge from the Soviet archives. Stalin acted aggressively in 1950, influenced by intelligence (some forwarded by Donald Maclean), by the failure of American policy in China and by the belief that the Soviet Union should move before the United States could implement "rollback" (p. 69). Stalin was determined to avoid war against the United States: this is underlined by his equivocal approach to extending air support to China in October 1950. Weathersby acknowledges that the evidence from Soviet and Chinese sources is contradictory on the latter aspect, but she tends to conclude that Stalin acted cautiously at the time of Chinese intervention in Korea. However, subsequently the Soviet air contribution was important: according to General Georgii Lebov, approximately 70,000 Soviet air personnel served in the 64th Fighter Aviation Corps during the war (p. 78).

Chen Jian discusses the reactions of Chinese leaders, with particular emphasis on Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai. As he sees developments, Mao wished to use the Korean conflict in order to consolidate the new regime's control of Chinese society, "as well as to promote new China's international prestige and influence" (p. 113). Indisputably China was more important in the world when the Korean War ended in 1953 than it had been when the fighting commenced in 1950. Lloyd C. Gardner reflects on the attitudes and prejudices of American policy makers, especially Dean Acheson; the Secretary of State was determined to act resolutely and to avert the dangers inherent in the courses of action urged by Republican right-wingers and by Syngman Rhee. The Soviet Union had tested an atomic bomb successfully in 1949: American policy should be firm but should not embark on rash initiatives.

Japan was the principal beneficiary of war in Korea: Japanese forces were only marginally (and illicitly) involved and the Japanese economy received a potent boost from the economic demand inspired by the Korean struggle. Yoshida Shigeru followed a subtle policy of cooperating with Washington while minimising the risks: he secretly supported antirearmament demonstrations in Tokyo during a visit from John Foster Dulles in January 1951 (p. 163).

William Stueck provides a succinct, balanced introduction and conclusion. This is a very useful volume as far as it goes. What is missing from it? There is not enough on the United Nations, on those states that contributed forces to the United Nations Command—and those that did not. An essay on India would have been welcome in which the dismissive American approach could have been contrasted with Jawaharlal...

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