The Atlantic Wall: Rommel's Plan to Stop the Allied Invasion! (review)

Alan F. Wilt's book, The Atlantic Wall, is a reprint of his 1975 book, The Atlantic Wall: Hitler's Defenses in the West, published by Iowa State University Press. In a statement that should be in the introduction he wrote: "Over the last few years [decades], a number of historians and other writers have accepted my contention regarding the Wall's significance. The core of this book has therefore been kept unchanged" (p. 224). The historiography of the German defense in Western Europe has not stood still. While an excellent study, this work does not provide the most recent scholarship, nor is it comprehensive.

Wilt's question was: "How effective . . . was the Atlantic Wall?" His conclusion was: "Although the Germans could have met the invasion more effectively . . . this should not detract altogether from the Atlantic Wall effort itself, for it did represent a considerable achievement." Wilt argued that the Atlantic Wall was a formidable defense, and it could have been better; however, it was not enough to stop the Allied invasion. The primary reason for the German failure was that they were over-committed. Wilt traced the development of the Atlantic Wall through three phases, starting with the Fall of France and ending with Operation Anvil/Dragoon, the invasion of southern France.

Wilt ably delineates the debate over defensive strategy and doctrine between Rommel and General Geyr von Schweppenberg: the latter favored a mobile defense based on a large strategic, armored reserve, and the former a cordon defense with the objective of defeating the enemy at the water's edge. The theater commander, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt is portrayed as the middleman who tried to reconcile these conflicting visions; however, it was Hitler who made the final decision on the distribution of forces. Hitler decided to compromise, satisfying no one. He also decided to maintain direct control over strategic reserves.

Wilt's book is well written, concise, and packed with information; however, it suffers from a lack of analysis and the failure to take a side in the Rommel-Geyr debate. This book needs two more chapters: first, an analysis of German defensive doctrine, starting with the World War I elastic defense in-depth, moving to the evolution of defensive operations on the Eastern Front, and concluding with the unique aspects of amphibious operations on the coast of Europe. It can be argued that neither Rommel nor Geyr got it right, that both of their doctrines failed to maximize the capabilities of German resources in the West, and that both men forgot the lessons of World War I.

Finally, a chapter that examines the British and American analyses of the German defense is needed. It is clear from the writings of Montgomery and Bradley that they did not understand Rommel's defensive plans and doctrine when they landed on 6 June 1944. Why? All the records for a more comprehensive study are available.