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Journal of Democracy 12.2 (2001) 59-73



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High Anxiety in the Andes

Crisis and Contention in Ecuador

José Antonio Lucero


Ecuador has just emerged from its 54th state of emergency in 21 difficult years of democratic rule. 1 As in other Andean countries, economic trouble, political instability, and social unrest make democracy look far from secure. Yet, despite perpetual crisis, Ecuador has somehow avoided both the internal warfare that afflicts Colombia (its northern neighbor) and the authoritarian excesses of Peru (its neighbor to the south). A look at the events of the past year in Ecuador reveals some of the peculiarities of continuing crisis in this Andean republic.

On 21 January 2000, organizations of indigenous peoples and sections of the Ecuadorian military capped weeks of national protests with a bloodless coup against the "neoliberal and antipopular" government of President Jamil Mahuad. This was the second time in three years that a democratically elected president was ousted before finishing his term. (Abdalá Bucaram had been deposed by the Congress in 1997 on the grounds of "mental incapacity.") In Mahuad's place, an army general, the president of the Confederation of Ecuadorian Indigenous Nationalities (CONAIE), and a former head of the Supreme Court installed themselves collectively as a government of "National Salvation." This "triumvirate" lasted for only a few hours, as General Carlos Mendoza, under heavy international pressure, abandoned the other two members of the junta and handed over authority to Mahuad's vice-president, Gustavo Noboa.

A year later, Noboa remained president, but 2001 began much as had 2000, with thousands of indigenous protesters paralyzing the nation's [End Page 59] roads in protest of the same set of neoliberal polices that Mahuad had sought to implement. This time, however, the armed forces were on the side of the state, not society. Employing greater repressive force than had previously been used in this protest-prone but usually nonviolent country, the government sought to quell the demonstrations. This strategy proved ineffective, however, and the state found itself negotiating with indigenous groups that dispayed both organizational might and broad national and international support.

As is so often the case, it is best to begin with the economy. "Choices of economic strategy can never guarantee safe arrival across disaster-strewn seas," writes economist John Sheahan, "but they can lessen many common kinds of danger or, even more easily, ensure shipwreck." 2 Unfortunately for Ecuadorians, recent policies seem to have made shipwreck all too apt a metaphor. The limited gains from state-led developmentalism under military governments in the 1960s and 1970s and from neoliberal reforms under civilian governments in the 1980s and 1990s had left the export-oriented Ecuadorian economy ill-prepared to navigate the dangers of declining oil prices, banking-sector mismanagement, and severe currency crises. Between 1998 and 2000, Ecuador suffered its worst economic reversals in a century. In the course of these two years, GNP shrank 7.3 percent, foreign investment fell by 34.7 percent, imports declined by 38.4 percent, and the value of the dollar against the sucre rose by 362 percent. Ecuador bled not only capital but also people, as almost 10 percent of the country's 12 million inhabitants emigrated. Contributing to all these woes was a severe banking crisis. In 1998 there were 42 banks in Ecuador; by 2000 there were only 26. Efforts to bail out the sinking banking sector have absorbed roughly 23 percent of GNP, placing a fiscal strain on the state and diverting resources from social spending. With over 70 percent of the population currently below the poverty line, it comes as little surprise that the United Nations currently ranks Ecuador as the poorest country in the hemisphere. 3

Equally serious political problems have accompanied these economic troubles. Not only have the last two elected presidents failed to serve out their full terms, but the legislature and political parties also find themselves in comparable states of disarray. According to 1999 polling data, only 6 percent of the population support political parties, and a meager 11 percent have faith in the Congress. Ecuador...

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