Strategic Logic and Political Rationality: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, and: Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel, and: Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence: Essays in Honor of Michael I. Handel (review)

These three volumes include a stimulating collection of essays written for an international conference held in honor of the late Michael I. Handel in November 2001 at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island. As the titles indicate, the essays explore wide-ranging themes, questions, and issues that had preoccupied Handel's powerful intellect throughout his life's study of strategy and war. The combination of uniformly high quality essays and well-conceived organization makes the volumes attractive not only individually but also as a set.

In Strategic Logic and Political Rationality, six essayists examine Handel's long-pursued interest in the existence and limitations of a universal strategic logic, and six others address the related question of how well liberal democratic governments are able to be politically rational in times of war. William Fuller's perceptive explanation of why reliable lessons from past wars are so elusive and prescriptions for improvement stands out especially in the first group. In the second half of the book, Karl Walling's analysis of political rationality in the Peloponnesian War produces a thoughtful and faceted story of serious civil-military tensions poisoning both Athenian and Spartan strategy, and essays on Great Britain by Andrew Lambert and David French and by Bradford Lee and James Kurth on aspects of American strategy are equally balanced and thought-provoking. Lee's chapter on the mixed results of American war termination efforts in the past century is especially worth a careful read.

Michael Handel was a prolific author and editor, publishing nine books and numerous articles and monographs. References to Winston Churchill are plentiful throughout his writings, as Handel greatly admired Churchill's strategic gifts, leadership, and writings. In honor of his great interest in Churchill, in Churchill and Strategic Dilemmas Before the World Wars, John Maurer, Christopher Bell, Brian McKercher, and David Jablonsky analyze Churchill's appreciation of the changing international environment in the years preceding the two world wars. All four are worthy of careful study and loyal to Handel's longstanding interest in Churchill, however two are especially noteworthy. John Maurer argues that as First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911 Churchill clearly recognized that the German naval building program constituted an "ever-present danger" to Britain and deftly mobilized domestic support for a program of naval construction that ensured Britain's naval preeminence. But Maurer also shows how Churchill believed that the arms race benefited neither country and actively sought to end the competition through calls for an Anglo-German naval holiday in shipbuilding. To Churchill's chagrin, the German government did not evince any interest in what Maurer believes was a most serious proposal. However, while Churchill may have underestimated the recklessness of Germany's leaders, he had successfully blunted their challenge to Britain's first line of defense. Christopher Bell's chapter on the limits of British power in the Pacific in the period 1921 to 1941 also concludes that Churchill may have exaggerated his ability to persuade Japan's leaders that a war against the Anglo-Americans would be disastrous and was to be avoided. Bell's account reveals Churchill fully appreciated the weakness of Britain's hand and its dependence upon American power and will to...