In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:

International Security 27.1 (2002) 149-173



[Access article in PDF]

A Review Essay

Mearsheimer's World-Offensive Realism and the Struggle for Security

Glenn H. Snyder


John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W. Norton, 2001.

More than fifty years have passed since Hans Morgenthau introduced "realism" as an approach to the study of international relations. Since then, the approach has withstood not only a steady assault from such external quarters as liberal institutionalism, the democratic peace school, and "constructivism" but also a marked divisive tendency. Splinter groups have emerged, each waving an identifying adjective to herald some new variant or emphasis. The first of these came in the late 1970s, when Kenneth Waltz's "neorealism" marked a major split from Morgenthau's traditional realism, which henceforth became known as "classical" realism. 1 Since then, especially during the last decade, new variants and new tags have proliferated. The field of international relations now has at least two varieties of "structural realism," 2 probably three kinds of "offensive realism," 3 [End Page 149] and several types of "defensive realism," 4 in addition to "neoclassical," "contingent," "specific," and "generalist" realism. 5 The debate among partisans of these differing views has been vigorous. It has also been helpful in clarifying—if not resolving—some of the issues involved. A prominent participant in these debates has been John Mearsheimer, under the banner of offensive realism. He now offers readers a book-length statement of his views, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. 6

This volume has been eagerly awaited by many international relations scholars and comes with strong recommendations from those who have read it. For example, Samuel Huntington declares on the dust jacket that it "ranks with, and in many respects supersedes, the works of Morgenthau and Waltz in the core canon of the realist literature on international politics." I attempt in this essay to assess to what extent, and in what respects, this encomium may be justified. I compare offensive realism mainly to Waltz's theory, because Mearsheimer himself casts Waltz as the leading defensive realist and his primary target. I conclude that the book is a major theoretical advance. It does not [End Page 150] supersede Waltz, but nicely complements him by introducing a theoretical rationale for revisionist states. This provides a foundation for merging offensive and defensive realism into a single theory. Mearsheimer also offers striking new insights into balance-of-power theory, the role of geography, and the debate over land power versus air and naval power. The theory is tested and illustrated over two centuries of history and projected two decades into the twenty-first century. These projections are provocative and pessimistic—but still plausible. The book's principal weakness is its overemphasis on power and security maximization as motivations of states' behavior.

This essay follows the organization of the book. It begins with a summary and critique of the core of offensive realism, then moves to a discussion of the historical evidence bearing on the theory. Next, Mearsheimer's ideas about balancing and buck-passing are criticized and related to broader concepts in alliance theory. After a brief look at his findings on the causes of war, the essay concludes with an analysis of his prescriptions for future U.S. foreign policy.

The Core Theory:
Mearsheimer versus Waltz

Mearsheimer begins with the assertion that great powers "maximize their relative power" (p. 21). That puts him close to Morgenthau, who famously proclaimed a never-ending struggle for power among states, arising from an animus dominandi—that is, a natural human urge to dominate others. 7 Mearsheimer, however, rejects this source of causation. There is a limitless power struggle, he avers, but what drives it is not an appetite for power in the human animal, but a search for security that is forced by the anarchic structure of the international system. When all states have capabilities for doing each other harm, each is driven to amass as much power as it can to be as secure as possible against attack. This assumption of a security motivation...

pdf

Share