Correspondence: Institutionalized Disagreement

To the Editors (Robert Jervis writes):

Randall Schweller's discussion of John Ikenberry's book After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars is acute, but his criticisms of the role of institutions miss the dynamics that can be involved. ¹ Schweller is convincing when he argues that international institutions are too weak to restrain major powers when their leaders decide that their interests call for breaking the rules or disregarding the views of the institution's other members. He does not discuss, however, the more important if more elusive role of institutions: their ability to shape even a powerful state's preferences. Thus while at the point of decision a major power will not be bound by the institution, its capabilities, outlook, and even values may have already been affected by how the institution operated previously. What Schweller downplays is how things can change over time—how institutions can strengthen themselves by altering the environment and the views of policymakers.

Part of the difficulty may be that political scientists usually look at discrete events or compare instances over time, through either case studies or large-N analysis, trying to hold constant as much as possible. Unlike historians, political scientists are less accustomed to thinking about how one event influences succeeding ones, and the feedbacks are missed by the standard comparative method—and indeed can subvert it. ² These effects are not captured by the common phrase "institutions are sticky," which implies that they keep their shape for a while before yielding to external pressures. Rather, institutions can influence the actors and the incentives they face.

What mechanisms might be involved? One is simply habit. ³ Although not a strong force when vital interests are concerned, its influence should not be dismissed. Bureaucracies and decisionmakers can become accustomed to cooperating in certain ways and working through established institutions that handle many issues. These patterns can become routine and be applied more broadly.

Second, institutions can develop constituencies in state bureaucracies, interest groups, and public opinion. ⁴ By providing information and analysis, participating groups can influence the outlooks and preferences of decisionmakers. In some cases, they may also grow into political forces potent enough to convince those at the top to deepen their support for a particular institution, although this is not likely when the issue is seen as crucial and the top decisionmakers have strong convictions.

Third, the operation of institutions can influence states' capabilities. When an issue arises, decisionmakers can deal with it only with the tools at their disposal. Institutions may have played a large role much earlier, however, in developing or suppressing instruments that will or will not be available at the later point of decision. A good example from internal politics (granted that we expect institutions to be more powerful here) is Jeffrey Legro's analysis of the role of the military's aversion to chemical warfare in Great Britain, Germany, and the United States in seeing that these weapons were not used in World War II. ⁵ It was not that the military overrode the civilian leaders' strong desire to use them, but rather that the neglect of chemical weapons during the interwar years meant that this arm was not nearly as attractive to the leaders during the war as it would have been had the organizations invested in these capabilities in the 1930s. An important part of the contemporary international landscape is that Germany does not have nuclear weapons. Much of the reason for this is that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Nuclear Planning Group were able to meet many of West Germany's needs for security and status earlier. ⁶ (To be sure, the policy was essentially an American one, but it probably would not have been possible without NATO.) Similarly, the existence of NATO made it possible for the United States to expand security guarantees to new members in Eastern and Central Europe...