Genocide: Conceptual and Historical Dimensions (review)

This volume is the result of a conference, entitled Genocide: The Theory—the Reality, which was held in 1991 at Yale University. The aims of this conference were to analyze (1) the relevance of various definitions of genocide in law and social theory for the interpretation of a wide range of situations which are generically called genocide; (2) the criteria used to classify different types of mass killings as genocide; (3) the implications of conceptual misuses of the term genocide; and (4) the extent to which case studies can show the strengths and weaknesses of various definitions. The emphasis of the conference was therefore more on definitions than on the theory of genocide. No contributor to this book discusses explicitly how definitions should be used to “interpret” genocidal situations. The book’s title drops the term “theory” in favor of the “conceptual dimensions” of genocide, but no clear explanation of the latter term is offered. The editor tells us that in the first part of the book contributors debate the conceptual dimensions of genocide and the implications of varying definitions, and in the second part they discuss “the relevance of the main theoretical insights” to the analysis of case studies. Definitional controversies do indeed dominate the first part, but it is not clear what the “theoretical insights” are supposed to be.

George Andreopoulos claims that the quest for “a comprehensive definition” of genocide would enable us to “map out” the area within which the concept is to operate. This metaphor is misleading, for definitions are not at all like maps. He goes on to maintain that “an analytically rigorous definition” could then be developed “which would avoid conceptual overstretch.” Avoiding conceptual overstretch is undoubtedly desirable, but Andreopoulos does not clarify his distinction between comprehensive, mapping definitions and analytically rigorous, restrictive definitions. A good definition, he says, would help us to create an early warning system for the detection of genocide-prone situations and, provided the appropriate mechanisms were in place, to devise preventive measures. Frank Chalk also believes that our choice of definition will have important implications for the measures we can take to predict and prevent genocides. This may be so, but this point is not convincingly developed. Andreopoulos also uses the term “paradigm” to refer to devices for the detection of genocide and “conceptual framework” for explanations of why genocide-prone situations have not developed into genocides. However, he does not distinguish clearly how he defines paradigms and conceptual frameworks and, thus, leaves very unclear his view of the logic of such operations as mapping, explanations, and prevention.

A definitional controversy raises the question of how, if at all, we should locate intention and motive in the conceptual map of genocide. Andreopoulos unfortunately conflates the conceptual distinction between intention and motive with the evidential problems of identifying intentions and motives. Israel Charny proposes a distinction between intentional genocide and other types of genocide, such as genocide in the course of colonization and the consolidation of power and aggressive war. However, this classification is confused, because the categories are not mutually exclusive and Charny, thus, gives us no reason to consider “intentional genocide” as a type of genocide at all. Some writers have argued that the emphasis on intent is misplaced and prefer structural explanations of genocide. Frank Chalk rejects this view, arguing that the intent of the perpetrator is crucial to genocide, because if it were not, all sorts of unintended lethal consequences of human action would count as genocide. Helen Fein carefully distinguishes intent from motive, and suggests how the necessary intent might be established. Andreopoulos correctly associates this definitional problem with the theoretical choice between voluntaristic and structural explanations, and correctly suggests that both forms of explanation are necessary.

Helen Fein and Leo Kuper emphasize the dangers of “conceptual overstretch” whereby, as Fein puts it, some people hold that anything awful must be genocide. However, Kuper’s insistence that the World War II atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and pattern bombings of Hamburg, Dresden...