Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion (review)

Jeffrey L. Kosky. Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001. Pp. xxiv + 223. Cloth, $39.95.

Emmanuel Levinas's thought has been a sleeping giant in continental philosophy, having influence upon many of his contemporaries while drawing minimal attention to himself. In the last few years, however, as evidenced by the explosion of secondary literature on Levinas, it is clear that scholars are awakening to Levinas's importance. Jeffrey Kosky's work, Levinas and the Philosophy of Religion, joins this secondary literature, carefully referencing both of Levinas's major works: Totality and Infinity and Otherwise than Being. Very often, scholars will focus on one of these texts and ignore the other; this author's dealings with both are insightful and comprehensive.

Kosky's work focuses upon the relationship between God and morality evident in Levinas who finds the two necessarily linked. Full marks should be given to anyone willing to attempt to investigate the theme Kosky attempts, for it is truly at the heart of Levinas's philosophy, meaning that a proper explication will involve delving into many difficult lines of thought. The two that receive Kosky's greatest attention are phenomenology, the core of Levinas's philosophy, and the pronounced end of metaphysics, which entails the end of God in philosophy. The greatest strength of Kosky's work is the attention it pays to the manner in which Levinas employs the methodology of phenomenology to think God in terms otherwise than ontological, a thinking that will hopefully neutralize the challenges of Nietzsche and Hegel. While respecting the insightful work done, I would like to offer a contention, an elaboration, and a reservation.

It should be counted to Kosky's credit that he foresees objections to his readings, but I do not believe I must count myself among Levinas's "zealous adherents" (Kosky, 124) to contend against his comparison between the affected subject with respect to Levinas and Befindlichkeit with respect to Heidegger. If the analogy holds, then there is reason to deny the place of ethical language, for Heidegger obviously does not use the language of ethics in his description. One reason for doubting this congruence is Levinas's own admonition against such a reading in "The Idea of the Infinite in Us" (Entre Nous [New York: Columbia University Press, 1998], 219-22). While the structure of the responsible self and Dasein reflect their affected condition, Levinas makes clear that the responsible self is affected by the infinite, not the world of Dasein which Dasein makes mine. The infinite affects the subject in such a way as to think more than what is mine. The affectivity of the infinite introduces the self to an excess that cannot be reduced to totality. The relation between infinity and the affected self is what creates the necessity for ethical language, not simply the affectedness of the subject.

As Kosky advances his argument in search of the relationship between God and morality, he carefully considers the philosophical context which heralds the Death of God. He does an excellent job covering the moves of thought throughout the history of philosophy that leads to Nietzsche's madman proclaiming that we have killed God. Undoubtedly, Levinas must have this context in mind when writing, but it is not clear that a God otherwise than ontological must be conceived with sole reference to this philosophical tradition. One reason for questioning such an obvious connection is Levinas's own claim, "I did not have the impression, early on, that philosophy was essentially atheist, and I still do not think it today" (Ethics and Infinity [Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press, 1985], 23). Perhaps an elaboration of Levinas's own history can add to the context of the place of God in Levinas's philosophy. Levinas recounts his own history in the brief work, "Signature" (Research in Phenomenology 8 [1978]: 175-89). There, he claims that his work must be seen in light of the Nazi horror...